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tional right to his job, he may at least assert that he cannot be fired for
reasons nor in a manner that constitutes infringement by the state of his
constitutional rights including the right to be free from arbitrary governmental action. The public employee may even argue that Justice Holmes's
holding has been so emasculated that it should no longer be considered
valid. Many courts may agree with the court in Albaum v. Carey:
Whether we state the matter in traditional terms that government
largess is a property right within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment ...or whether we say that to deprive a government employee of

his job for exercising Constitutionally protected rights is to deprive of
the liberty guaranteed by that amendment, or whether we merely
reason that all government action with respect to its employees must
meet the standards imposed by the Amendment, our conclusion is the
same: the Federal Constitution requires every level of government
to afford nondiscriminatory and fair treatment, both substantively and
procedurally, to all its employees; conditions of governmental employment may not stifle fundamental liberties. 93
The more recent cases have one essential element in common; each
recognizes that the state is always the state and no matter the capacity in
which it acts, be it employer or landlord, it is constrained by the Constitution.94 When public employers, as well as the courts, recognize this
basic fact and act accordingly the public employee will truly have made
significant progress in protecting himself against arbitrary dismissal.93
BEN F. TENNILLE

NOTES
Admiralty-Recovery Under the Jones Act for Foreign Seamen:
The Demise of the Law of the Flag
"A vessel at sea may be a thing of beauty.., but.., she presents a
structure full of hazards for even the most experienced mariner."' This
283 F. Supp. at 9-10.

See Van Alstyne, The ConstitutionalRights of Public Employees: A Comment
on the InappropriateUses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 751, 752 (1969).

" Hopefully, the entire task of protecting the rights of public employees will not

be left to the courts. See Rosenbloom, The Constitutionand the Civil Service, Some
Recent Developments, Judicialand Political,18 U. KAN. L. Rsv. 839 (1970) ; Note,
Dismissal of Federal Employees-The Emerging JudicialRole, 66 COLUm. L. REv.

719 (1966).

'2 M. Nopus, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 612 (3d ed. 1970).
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is certainly as true for the foreign seaman as the American, yet UnitedStates courts have in the past been reluctant to extend coverage under the
Jones Act2 to foreign seamen proceeding against foreign shipowners.'
In 1920 Congress passed the Jones Act4 to provide injured seamen with
the rights and remedies afforded railway employees under the Federal
Employers' Liability Acts.5 The practical effect of this legislation was to
give to seamen a cause of action for negligence while abolishing the fellowservant rule6 and the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory
7
negligence.
One of the primary problems in dealing with the Jones Act has been
the proper ambit of the phrase "any seaman." When a foreign seaman
brings an action under the Act for personal injuries sustained aboard a
foreign vessel, the court must decide whether American law may or should
be applied. Conceivably, in international shipping, a number of nations
may be relevantly linked to the transaction. In the landmark decision,
Lauritzen v. Larsen,' the Supreme Court attempted to establish guidelines
in determining whether the Jones Act may be applied to the disposition'
of actions involving foreign contacts.
Justice Jackson began this elaborate opinion by stressing the importance of comity and the need for respecting the laws of other sovereignties. While recognizing that technically the Jones Act "conferred
an American right of action" on "any seaman," 9 he recognized the further
necessity of "reconciling our own with foreign interests and in accom46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
""The Jones Act was passed for the welfare of A.terican seamen." The Magdapur, 3 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (emphasis added). See also The
Paula, 91 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 750 (1937).
But see Arthur v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 72 F.2d 662 (5th Cir.
1934).
' Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with
the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal
injury to railway employees shall apply ....
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
545 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
' The fellow-servant rule holds that the employer is not liable for injuries to an
employee caused by the negligence of a fellow employee.
'Although after passage of the Jones Act contributory negligence was no bar
to recovery in an action against his employer, the rule of comparative negligence
was applied, and damages were reduced in proportion to the negligence of the injured seaman. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1964).
"345 U.S. 571 (1953).
Id. at 576.
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modating the reach of our own laws to those of other martime nations.""
The Jones Act was construed "to apply only to areas and transactions in
which American law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law."" This caveat was issued for consideration
when a choice of law was necessary:
[I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of
the necessity of mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided;
nor should we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as
strong a warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an American
12
transaction.
Justice Jackson indicated that the proper way to avoid or resolve the
conflicts between competing laws was to ascertain points of contact between
the transaction and the governments involved and weigh the significance
of these contacts. Seven factors "generally conceded to influence choice
of law"' 3 were set out along with the weight and significance to be
accorded each. They were (1) place of the wrongful act, (2) law of the
flag, (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured, (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner, (5) place of the contract, (6) inaccessibility of foreign
forum, and (7) the law of the forum.
Of these factors, it was said that "[p] erhaps the most venerable and
universal rule of maritime law ... is that which gives cardinal importance
to the law of the flag."' 4 Allowing the law of the ship's flag to govern torts
aboard a ship which might pass through numerous jurisdictions and spend
much time on the high seas added a dimension of predictability and provided a measure of uniformity. The Court re-emphasized " the significance of the flag by holding that the "weight given to the ensign
overbears most other connecting events"'" and it "must prevail unless
some heavy counterweight appears."'
Despite the emphasis placed on the law of the flag, the Court recognized the prevalence of "flags of convenience":
'ld. at 577.
111Id.
2
Id. 582.
1 3Id. at
at 583.
1 'Id. at 584.
t8 The law of

the flag had become settled American doctrine. See RESTATEMENT

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

345 U.S. at 585.
17Id. at 586.
1

§§ 405-06 (1934).
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[I]t is common knowledge that in recent years a practice has grown,
particularly among American shipowners, to avoid stringent shipping
laws by seeking foreign registration eagerly offered by some countries.
Confronted by such operations, our courts on occasion have pressed
beyond the formalities of more or less nominal foreign registration to
enforce against American shipowners the obligations which our law
8
places upon them.1
When the flag is one of convenience, its significance as a point of contact
diminishes, and there is a corresponding increase in the importance of the
allegiance of the shipowner.
Recognition of the flag-of-convenience problem by the Supreme Court
presaged a liberal trend in the application of the Lauritzen factors. It is
in dealing with vessels of "convenient". foreign registry that the greatest
extension in the application of the Jones Act to foreign seamen has occurred and this is perhaps the area of greatest confusion. A review of the
ensuing decisions reveals the state of flux which evolved.
Zielinski v. Empresa Hondurenade Vapores9 began a series of Jones
Act decisions in the prolific, if not always consistent, District Court for
the Southern District of New York. A foreign seaman who had been injured aboard a ship of Honduran registry owned by a Honduran company the stock of which was owned by an American company was allowed
to sue under the Jones Act. In disregarding the flag of the vessel, the
court expressed the belief that effect should be given to the nationality of
actual control of the ship. This decision was followed by holdings that
American ownership of the stock of the shipowning corporation alone was
not enough to justify the application of the Jones Act.20 Bobolakis v.
Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A."' then followed,
with a decision by the court that "majority ownership and control by
Americans of the corporate owner of the vessel represents sufficient contact
with the United States to justify the application of the Jones Act,"' but
cast doubt that the distinction between ownership and control was valid
and indicated a belief that American ownership alone was sufficient for
the Jones Act to apply. A retreat from this position was indicated in
18
Id. at 587.
1953).,
19 113 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y.
"Mproumeriotis v. Seacrest Shipping' Co., 149 F. Supp. 265 (S.D:N.Y.
1957); Argyros v. Polar Compania De Navegacion, Ltda., 146 F. Supp., 624
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
1958).
21 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y.
2 Id. at 238.
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Moutzouris v. National Shipping & Trading Co.23 in which the court held
that American stock ownership of the shipowning corporation, without
more, was insufficient for application of the Jones Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had earlier attempted to
inject a measure of stability into the application of the Lauritzen factors in
Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc.24 Citing the "inherent vagueness" of the Lauritzen test, Judge Medina attempted a "restatement of
the method of approach and the principles to be applied." '2 5 He concluded
that the test was one of "substantial contacts," and held as substantial,
contacts that included remote United States ownership.2"
The Supreme Court addressed itself to the application of Lauritzen in
two noteworthy cases. In refusing to apply the Jones Act in Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 2 7 it stressed again the need for
respect of the interests of foreign nations and advised the use of "circumspection" when "adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct
of our international relations."2 Although McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras2 9 did not concern the Jones Act, the
issue was whether American law extended to crews on foreign flag
vessels that were beneficially owned by a United States corporation. The
National Labor Relations Board, using a test relying on the relative
weight of American as compared with foreign contacts, had found that the
operations involved substantial United States contacts so as to require
application of American law. The Court rejected this "balancing of contacts" theory, saying its use could "raise considerable disturbance not only
in the field of maritime law but in our international relations as well."8 0
Even though the Court pierced the corporate veil and found American
owners, application of American law was not allowed. In a footnote, the
" 194 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
",263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
Id. at 439.
'8 The defendant was a Liberian corporation the stock of which was held by a
Panamanian corporation, and citizens of the United States owned all the stock of
the Panamanian corporation. In addition, all the officers of the Liberian shipowning
corporation were American citizens and the company's principal place of business
was in New York City.
"358 U.S. 354 (1959). The Romero decision has major significance in areas

of admiralty other than choice of law. For a more complete discussion of the case
see H. BAER, ADmrnALTY LAw OF THE SUPREmE CouRT § 5-1, at 104-11 (2d ed.
1969) and Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27
U. CH . L. Rxv. 1 (1959).
28 358 U.S. at 383.
"372 U.S. 10 (1963).

30Id. at 19.
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Court again stressed the importance of the law of the flag in determining
the applicability of the Jones Act."' Prompted by this decision, the Second
32
reconsidered the
Circuit Court of Appeals in Tjonaman v. A/S Glittre
"substantial contacts" test it had announced in Bartholomewm and, noting
that this test had been interpreted as limiting the dominating importance
of the law of the flag, recognized McCulloch as restoring that importance.
This was the development of the law preceding a direct conflict between the Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals which ultimately
84
led to action by the Supreme Court in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis.
Tsakonites v. Transpacific CarriersCorp.35 came before the second circuit
in 1966. Following its interpretation of McCulloch and its reasoning in
Tjonammn the court determined that, although the great majority of the
stock of the corporation that owned the vessel was owned by a permanent
resident alien of the United States who substantially controlled the ship
from New York, the flag was not a flag of convenience and its law should
prevail. Primary consideration was given to comity and it was noted
that "[t]he Supreme Court has given no indication that the law of the
flag (when not a flag of convenience) is still not to be considered of paramount importance." 6 Judge Waterman dissented, noting that United
States courts do not hesitate to pierce the corporate veil to apply United
States law to Americans who have sought to circumvent their responsibility
by incorporating and registering their vessels abroad. It was his contention that resident aliens were accorded the same constitutional protections as citizens and enjoyed the considerable benefits of resident alien
status and should therefore have imposed upon them the same duties and
obligations as citizens.
The facts in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis87 closely parallel those in
Tsakonites. The Greek flag vessel on which the injury occurred was
owned by a Panamanian corporation s that was in turn owned by a Greek
corporation operating from a base in New York. 9 Ninety-five per cent
" Id. n.9.
" 340 F.2d 290, 292 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
"3See p. 324 supra.
'398 U.S. 306 (1970).
'K368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1007 (1967).
o Id. at 429.
'o398 U.S. 306 (1970).
" The Panamanian corporation was in reality a holding company with no operational responsibilities in connection with the ship. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,
412 F.2d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1969).
" The company's principal office, employing seventy-five, was in New York. An
office of fifteen employees was located in New Orleans. Id. n.5.
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of the stock of the operating corporation was owned by a Greek citizen who
had resided in the United States since 1945.40
* The injured seaman, a Greek citizen, brought an action in the district
'court and sought recovery under the Jones Act.4 1 The court found the
American contacts "quite substantial" 42 and held the Jones Act applicable,
awarding damages of six thousand dollars.4 3 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed, finding the flag of the vessel "more symbolic than real.""
The court recognized that in Tsakonites the second circuit "reached a
contrary result on identical factors, '45 but favored the reasoned dissent of
Judge Waterman, rejecting outright the majority position.
. In light of the developments in the application of the Lauritzen test
to foreign vessels flying flags of convenience, culminating in the TsakonitesRhoditis split, the Supreme Court granted Hellenic Lines' petition for
certiorari. 4 6 In a five-to-three 47 decision, the application of the Jones Act

by the fifth circuit was affirmed.
. Justice Douglas began the opinion by recognizing that the majority
of the Lauritzen factors operated against Jones Act jurisdiction, but
ountered by stating that the test was not meant to be mechanical nor the
facfors exhaustive. The test of "substantial contacts" formulated by the
permanent resident alien in 1952. 398 U.S. at
309.."The owner had become a lawful

0" The suit originated as a libel (complaint) in rem against the ship and in
personam against Universal Cargo Carriers and Hellenic Lines. After discovering
the. defendants' substantial United States contacts, Rhoditis successfully moved to
have the Jones Act applied. 412 F.2d at 920 n.4. Under the Jones Act, the suit is
in personam against the shipowner, and not against the ship itself. Plamals v. S.S.
'Tinar Del Rio," 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
"2In addition to the fact that the controlling corporation was based in New
York and owned by'a permanent 'resident alien of the' United States, the injury
occuried in a United States port and the entire income of the vessel was generated
ly cargo either originating or terminating in the United States. On the other hand,
b th the controlling corporation and its owner were in fact Greek, the vessel was
ri gistered in Greece, the injured seaman was a citizen of Greece, the contract of
employment was signed in Greece and specifically provided that the Greek legal
system should be used in settling any claims arising out of the contract, and relief
was apparently available in a -Greek forum.
" Rhoditis v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 273 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ala. 1967).
,"Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 923 (5th Cir. 1969).
"'Id. The resident alien shipowner was the same man in both Tsakonites and
Rhoditis, but the facts of the cases were not completely identical. The variations
were minor, however, and apparently of no consequence. See Note, AdmiraltyChoice of Lau-Jones Act Held Applicable in Action Against Resident Alien Shipo6ne# 44 TUL. L. Rzv. 347, 353 n.34 (1970).
"396 U.S. 1000 (1970).
"'Chief Justice -Burger and Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented, with Justice
Harlan authoring the opinion. Justice Douglas wrote for the majority.
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second circuit in Bartholomew48 and the addition of "base of operations"
as a factor of importance by the court in Pavlou v.Ocean TradersMarine
Corp.,4" were cited favorably. The Court's unwillingness to allow the
owner a competitive advantage "by allowing him to escape the obligations
and responsibility""0 of the Jones Act echoed Judge Waterman's dissent in
Tsakonites.
Justice Harlan's dissent expressed a belief that the premises on which
Lauritzen was founded had been misconstrued by courts "that have taken
the phenomenon of 'convenient' foreign registry as a wedge for displacing
the law of the flag."'" The purpose of Lauritzen "was to reconcile the allembracing language of the Jones Act with ... principles of comity .... ,52
It was said that "contacts ... simply serve as an adequate nexus between
this country and defendant to assert jurisdiction in a case where Congressional policy is otherwise furthered," and "have no bearing in themselves on whether Jones Act recovery is appropriate" no matter how "substantial or numerous. ' 8 Justice Harlan noted that only recently in
McCulloch the Court had declined to override the law of the flag where
there were substantial United States contacts including beneficial ownership
of the vessel by a United States company, and that perhaps the courts have
become "mesmerized by contacts."' 54
Although the Supreme Court in Lauritzen had accorded paramount
importance to the law of the flag in determining the applicability of the
Jones Act, tacit approval was given to the practice of looking beyond the
flag when the foreign registration of the vessel was "more or less nominal." 5r Implementation of this decision has resulted in an increasingly
liberal trend in the determination of whether a flag is one of "convenience,"
and the lack of specific guidelines in making this determinaiton has resulted in confusion in the case law. The need for clarification of what
exactly constitutes a "flag of convenience" and positive standards to apply
once this determination has been made was obviously indicated by the
Tsakonites-Rhoditis conflict. The Supreme Court in Rhoditis failed to
respond to these needs.
Beginning with Lauritzen, the Court's repeated emphasis on the lav;
"See pp. 324-25 supra.
"211 F. Supp. 320, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
"0398 U.S. at 310.
"Id. at 315.
rId. at 318.
"Id. at 315.
"Id. at 318.
"See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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of the flag established a position heavily relied on by the courts. The
treatment in Rhodits, whereby the flag was summarily relegated to a
position of insignificance, with no consideration of whether it was real
or illusory, undercuts this position. A reassessment of the significance
to be accorded this "most venerable"'5 6 factor was indicated. "Base of
operations" was approved as a factor due consideration, but there was no
prescription for its application. The Court's inconsistency and failure to
respond adequately to the needs revealed by the confused application of
Lauritzen will do little to order the confusion.
The reasoning that led to the Court's emphasis on respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations and concern that our law should be
interpreted consistent with principles of international law in Lauritzen,
Romero, and McCulloch is as valid today as when dictated. The decision
in Rhoditis portends a broadening of the circumstances under which the
courts of the United States will permit utilization of the Jones Act by
aliens injured in the service of foreign vessels-a trend which could lead to
unwarranted consequences. It has been suggested that the "retaliations"
by foreign countries warned of in Lauritcn 57 are not a threat where the
alien shipowner is a resident of the United States, 8 but the court in
Tsakonites found significant Greek contacts, 9 which Greece has a recognized interest in protecting. Application of American law with its attendant bountiful recoveries could effectively encumber foreign shipping,
and the threat of retaliations becomes more than a remote possibility. 0
The United States would look askance at the efforts of any foreign power
to impose its law-and thus burden our shipping industry-for the purpose of adjudicating rights between American citizens created by American law.
See text accompanying note 14 supra.

See text accompanying note 12 mpra.
Note, Admiralty-Conflict of Laws-Provisions of Jones Act Applicable So
As To Allow Recovery To Alien Seamen Injured In A United States Port On A
Foreign Flag Vessel Owned And Controlled By United States Alien Domiciliaries,
1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 247, 253-54 (1969); Note, 44 TUL. L. REv. 347, mupra note 45,
at 354, suggest that Greece has no interest to protect where the defendant shipowner,
though technically a citizen of Greece, is a resident of the United States.
"' In addition to the fact that the ship was registered in and flew the flag of
Greece and the injured plaintiff was a Greek citizen who had signed a contract in
Greece limiting his rights to those arising under Greek law, the court noted,
inter alia, that all the officers and directors as well as all the shareholders of
Hellenic Lines were Greek, the company maintained an office in Greece, and the crew
and officers of the ship were almost entirely Greek. 368 F.2d at 427-28.
"The Royal Greek Government filed a brief in the Supreme Court as Amicus
Curiae urging reversal of the fifth circuit's application of the Jones Act.
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In the face of the Court's apparent disregard of the law of the flag,
extension of the reasoning applied in Rhoditis would leave virtually no
contact insufficient for the application of American law. Maintenance
of a United States office could be the critical factor rendering a legitimate
foreign shipper liable under the Jones Act. Foreign shipowners are encouraged to locate their "base of operations" elsewhere, lest they are
forced to shoulder a burden they would not otherwise encounter.
Another necessary consequence of this decision is the additional
burden the already overcrowded United States courts can look forward
to in the way of unnecessary, unwarranted, and ill-advised litigation by
foreign seamen attempting to take advantage of the liberal provisions of
the Jones Act rather than proceeding in the appropriate foreign jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that the Jones Act is "welfare
legislation .. .entitled to a liberal construction to accomplish its beneficent purposes."'" This pronouncement is in line with a trend in admiralty law manifested most recently by the decision in Rhoditis. Despite
the humanitarianism of this action, reasoned, logical, consistent development of the law is perhaps more to be desired. An examination by the
Court, not only of the direction of their decisions in this area, but of the
2
motivating forces behind them might well be in order."
JOHN

E.

HODGE, JR.

Admiralty-Wrongful Death Action Under General Maritime Law
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.' the Supreme Court of the
United States held for the first time that an action will lie under general
maritime law for death caused by a violation of maritime duties. In so
holding, the court specifically overruled an 1886 decision' and took a
giant stride toward clearing up what had become a legal morass of anomalies and inequities.
The plaintiff in Moragne, alleging both negligence and unseaworthiness, sued in a Florida state court seeking to recover damages from a
shipowner for the wrongful death of her husband, a longshoreman, aboard
a vessel on navigable waters within the state of Florida. The suit was
"E.g., Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McCallister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949).
' See H. BAER, supra note 27, at 192.
1398 U.S. 375 (1970).
'The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
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removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida which dismissed the unseaworthiness claim but made the necessary
certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 8 to allow plaintiff an interlocutory
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court of appeals,
under a procedure provided by Florida state law, 4 certified to the Florida
Supreme Court the question of whether the Florida wrongful death statute
encompassed a cause of action for unseaworthiness. The Florida court
answered that question in the negative,' and on return of the case to the
court of appeals, the order of the district court was affirmed.' The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 7 and invited the United
States to participate as amicus curiae.3 Before discussing the court's
decision, it will be helpful to first obtain a view of the law of maritime
wrongful death as it stood before Moragne.
MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH

Martimne Duties Generally
Since ancient times seamen who have been injured or taken sick
while in the service of their ship have been entitled to maintenance and
cure, 9 which includes living allowance, nursing and medical expenses,
and wages until they recover."0 This remedy is available regardless of the
presence or absence of fault, but it provides the seaman with no real compensation-rather it merely sustains him during his recovery."
In seeking a compensatory recovery, however, the seaman may also
avail himself of two other grounds: breach of the duty of seaworthiness
and breach of the duty of care. The duty of seaworthiness 12 is a develop328 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964) provides for the court of appeals to allow, at its
discretion, an appeal to be taken from an otherwise not appealable order in a civil
action if the district judge states in writing that the order "involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion ...
' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1970).
5
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
' Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
'Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
' Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 396 U.S. 952 (1969).
'H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREmE CouRT § 1-1, at 1 (2d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as BAER].
10
BAER § 1-2, at 6.
"BAER § 1-4, at 13.
12
"Seaworthiness" has been defined as the "absolute nondelegable duty of a
shipowner to provide.., a vessel 'sufficient in all respects for the trade in which it
is employed' ...and to prevent... injury [to seamen] by any part of the vessel
or equipment used in the ordinary course of their employment." Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1968).
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ment of the maritime case law and traces its beginnings back to the late
nineteenth century.' 3 Since the decision of the Supreme Court in The
Osceola,4 the generally accepted view has been that this duty imposes
liability absolutely.' 5
The duty of care was of little use to seamen until 1920 because the
duty did not extend to injuries suffered from the negligence of members
of the ship's company.'" In 1920, however, this duty was given substance
with the enactment by Congress of two statutes: the Jones Act1 7 which
incorporates part of the Federal Employers Liability Act' and gives seamen essentially the same rights against their employers as railroad employees are given against their employers; and the Death on the High
Seas Act' which provides a more general cause of action for wrongful
death caused by "wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high
seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any state."
Wrongful Death Actions
At first glance it would seem that, if a person to whom one of these
duties is owed were killed as a result of a breach of one of the duties, a
wrongful death action would lie against the breaching party. In fact,
however, the law on this point before Moragne was much more complex.
The problem began with the Supreme Court's 1886 decision, The Harrisburg,2 0 which quite bluntly held that the maritime law does not afford an
action for wrongful death in the absence of a statute granting such an
action. Between 1886 and 1920 the only recoveries for maritime wrongful
deaths were in cases in which the federal courts allowed the application
of state wrongful death statutes."' Then in 1920 the two previously
I"Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 544 (1960).
' 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 547 (1960).
10 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
1746 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). In addition to granting an injured seaman a right to
sue for negligence, this act also gives the personal representative of a deceased
seaman a cause of action for the seaman's death if the seaman died because of the
negligence of the employer.
18 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964). "The FELA and the Jones Act impose upon the
employer the duty of paying damages when injury to the worker is caused, in whole
or in part, by the employer's fault. This fault may consist of a breach of the duty
of care, analogous but by no means identical to the general common law duty ...
Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958).
1946 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
20119 U.S. 199 (1886).
21
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393 (1970). E.g.,
The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907) (Delaware wrongful death statute applied
where the vessels were owned by Delaware corporations).
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mentioned acts were enacted. In addition, all of the states have enacted
wrongful death statutes.' It has been in the interpretation of rights under
these various statutes that the confusion has arisen.
In 1930, ten years after the passage of the two acts, the Supreme
Court said, in dictum, that the Jones Act provides the exclusive remedy
for the death of a seaman." In 1964, in Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp.,2 4 the Court, relying on the earlier dictum, arrived at the same conclusion. This would seem to indicate that any recovery for the wrongful
death of a seaman must depend upon a showing of negligence. However,
in Kernan v. American Dredging Co.,25 the Court inserted a footnote20

which has been construed by at least three authorities as meaning that
unseaworthiness is a basis for recovery under the Death on the High
Seas Act.' It is clear that the Court in Moragne attaches such a meaning
to the footnote. 28 Therefore the law as it applied to seamen before
Moragne apparently was that beyond a marine league from shore, a wrongful death action would lie for unseaworthiness, but that within a marine
league recovery would have to rest upon a showing of negligence under
the Jones Act.
In construing the rights of land-based workers, however, the Supreme
Court has been more generous. In 1926, in a suit by a stevedore against
his employer, the Court classified the stevedore as a seaman because he
was rendering a "maritime service formerly rendered by the ship's
crew. '"9 Thus he was allowed to recover under the Jones Act. This
holding was amplified twenty years later in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki80
in which the Court allowed an injured stevedore to sue a shipowner on
a theory of unseaworthiness despite Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion that the duty of seaworthiness is owed only to seagoing crew
398 U.S. 375, 390 (1970).
" Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
2'379 U.S. 148 (1964).
'355 U.S. 426 (1958).
"Id. at 430 n.4, which states, "Where death occurs beyond a marine league
from state shores, the Death on the High Seas Act... provides a remedy for wrongful death. Presumably any claims, based on unseaworthiness, for damages accrued
prior to the decedent's death would survive, at least if a pertinent state statute is
effective to bring about a survival of the seaman's right ......
"Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970) ; Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 159 (1964) (dissenting opinion by Goldberg, J.); 1 P. EDELMAN, MARITIME INJURY AND DEATH 235 (1960).
2

28

398 U.S. at 395.

"International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
0328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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members because only they are "exposed to the perils of the sea and all
the risks of unseaworthiness, with little opportunity to avoid those dangers
or to discover and protect themselves from them or to prove who is
responsible for the unseaworthiness causing the injury."'" Since the
decision in Sieracki the Court has extended the duty of seaworthiness to
"an electrician, a ship cleaner, a shoreside watchman, a repairman, a
rigger""2 and others. Two 1959 cases-The Tungus v. Skovcgaard3 and
United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hooks Pilots Association v.
Halecki -- illustrate the pre-Moragne status of the maritime wrongful death law as applied to land-based workers as a result of the preceding
line of cases. In The Tungus the Court found the New Jersey wrongful
death statute broad enough to encompass an action for death caused by unseaworthiness in state waters and, therefore, allowed the survivor of an
oil company's maintenance foreman to recover for the foreman's death.
There was never any question that a duty of seaworthiness was owed to
the decedent. The only argument was whether the duty was contained in
state law as the majority claimed, 5 or in federal law (with state law
providing a remedy) as the minority claimed.3 6 In Halecki the Court
disallowed a similar suit for recovery for the death of an employee of an
electrical concern because the Court found that he was not, under the
Sieracki rule, one to whom the duty of seaworthiness was owed. The
Court restated the test as whether the person involved was doing "work
traditionally done by members of the crew. 1sT In short, the earlier line
of cases established a duty of seaworthiness to certain land-based workers
for which a wrongful death recovery could be obtained if the worker met
the Sieracki test, and if the applicable state wrongful death statute contained the duty of seaworthiness.
In summary, the end result of all of these cases was that recovery for
the death of a land-based worker can often be had more easily than a
recovery for the death of a seagoing crew member. Justice Goldberg
seems to be correct in his criticism of this situation:
Id. at 104.
-21 P. EDELmAr, MmuA rzT INJURY AND DEATH 177 (1960) (footnotes
omitted).
"358 U.S. 588 (1959).
" 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
" The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 596 (1959).
" Id. at 601. (Brennan, Black and Douglas, J.J., and Warren, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
' 358 U.S. at 617.
31
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[T]he Court today preserves an anomaly in admiralty law which has
neither reason nor justification. A seaman who is either injured or
killed while on the high seas is given a remedy for either negligence
or unseaworthiness .... a seaman who is injured in territorial waters
may also sue for either negligence or unseaworthiness ,...
an injured
seaman may also sue for maintenance and cure and these claims
survive his death, . . . a nonseaman's death in territorial waters gives
rise to an action based upon the applicable state wrongful death statute
for both negligence and the general maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness. . . . Only the family survivors of a seaman are left without a
remedy for his death within territorial waters caused by failure to
maintain a seaworthy vessel. Only they are denied recourse to this
rule of absolute liability and relegated to proof of negligence under the
Jones Act. This disparity in treatment has been characterized by the
lower federal courts as "deplorable," "anomalous," "archaic," "unnecessary," and "hard to understand." . . . I agree with these characterizations.3 8
THE MORAGNE DE:CISION
Early in the Moragne decision the Court concludes that "the primary
source of the confusion is not to be found in The Tungus, but in The
Harrisburg,and that the latter decision, somewhat dubious even when
rendered, is such an unjustifiable anomaly in the present maritime law
that it should no longer be followed."" The Court attacks The Harisburg
as being quite likely wrong when it was decided. 40 But the real basis of
the decision is the Court's determination that developments since The
Harrisburg have rendered that case invalid.41 The developments in
question are the rejections-partly judicial, but largely legislative--of
the old common law policy against recovery for wrongful death; these
developments include the adoption by every state and by Congress of
statutes allowing wrongful death recoveries.'
On the basis of these
developments the Court concludes that "Congress has given no affirmative
indication of an intent to preclude the judicial allowance of a remedy for
wrongful death to persons in the situation of this petitioner." 4 8
The Court rejected the argument that the Jones Act and the Death
" Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 158-59 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).
39 398 U.S. at 378.
'Id. at 379-88.
"Id. at 388.
,2Id. at 390.
" Id. at 393.
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on the High Seas Act preempted the field, concluding that a refusal to
recognize a general maritime remedy for wrongful death "would perpetuate three anomalies of present law" : (1) "the discrepancy produced
whenever the rule of The Harrisburgholds sway: within territorial waters,
identical conduct violating federal law . . . produces liability if the
victim is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed,"4 5 (2) "that
identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in
death, produce liability outside the three-mile limit . . . but not within
the territorial waters of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims,"4 and (3) "that a true seaman-that is, a member of the
ship's company, covered by the Jones Act-is provided no remedy for
death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman... does have such a remedy when allowed by state statute." 47
Accordingly the Court overruled The Harrisburg. But in so doing
it went beyond the language necessary to decide the case before it and
held: "an action does lie under general maritime law for death caused by
violation of maritime duties."4 The Court went to the trouble to append
to its decision a footnote which makes it clear that Gillespie is no longer
good law ;49 in short to specify that the Jones Act shall no longer be the
exclusive remedy for the wrongful death of a seaman within territorial
waters. The result of the Court's holding seems to be that a breach of
either maritime duty resulting in either injury or death on either territorial or non-territorial waters will result in liability. Thus the anomalies
and inequities are eliminated, and the only holdover problem from the
pre-Moragne la:v is that created by the Sieracki line of cases, namely the
determination of who is owed these duties.
THE BENEFICIARIES

The Court left open the question as to who should be the beneficiaries
for this new right of action.50 There appear to be four possible schemes of
making this determination: (1) that followed by the Death on the High
Seas Act which provides damages "for the exclusive benefit of the
decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative,"5' 1 (2) that
"Id. at 395.
'5 Id. at 395.
"Id. at 395.
"7 Id. at 395-96.
,8 Id. at 409.
"
5 Id. at 396 n.12.
Id. at 408.
5146 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).
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followed by the Jones Act which incorporates the FELA and provides a
tightly structured scheme "for the benefit of the surviving widow or
husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon
such employee,""2 (3) that followed by the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,5 3 which provides standardized amounts in
the manner of typical workmen's compensation acts, and (4) that followed by an applicable state wrongful death statute. The first three were
mentioned by the Court5" and would seem to be the prime candidates.
One of the reasons advanced by the Court in Moragne for its decision
is the discrepancy between various state laws; and this factor would
probably eliminate the fourth possibility. Of the remaining three, the
Court appears to lean heavily toward the first, the Death on the High
Seas Act:
It is the congressional enactment that deals specifically and exclusively with actions for wrongful death, and that simply provides a
remedy-for deaths on the high seas-for breaches of the duties imposed
by maritime law. In contrast, the beneficiary provisions of the Jones
Act are applicable only to a specific class of actions-claims by seaman
against their employers-based on violations of the special standard
of negligence imposed under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
That standard appears to be unlike any imposed by general maritime
law. Further, although the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act is applicable to longshoremen such as petitioner's
late husband, its principles of recovery are wholly foreign to those of
general maritime law-like most workmen's compensation laws, it deals
only with the responsibilities of employers for death or injury to their
employees, and provides standardized amounts of compensation regardless of fault on the part of the employer.
The only one of these statutes that applies not just to a class of
workers but to any "person," and that bases liability on conduct
violative of general maritime law, is the Death on the High Seas Act.
The borrowing of its schedule of beneficiaries, argues the United States,
will not only effectuate the expressed congressional preference in this
area but will also promote uniformity by ensuring that the beneficiaries
will be the same for identical torts, rather than varying with the employment status of the decedent. 55
3245 U.S.C. §51 (1964).
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
"398 U.S. at 407-08.
"Id.
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Rather than determine the issue, however, the court left it for "further
sifting through the lower courts."5
CONCLUSION

Both from the standpoint of providing equitable treatment for all
maritime workers and from the standpoint of providing a more uniform
body of law in the maritime tort area, there is little question but that
Moragne is properly decided. The inequity of the pre-Moragne law, as
pointed out by Justice Goldberg, was so apparent as to be beyond dispute.
The only real choices open to the court in eliminating this inequity were
to reduce the recovery available to land-based workers so as to bring them
into line with seagoing workers, or to extend the recovery available to seagoing workers. In light of recent trends in tort law-not only in maritime
law, but also in products liability and other areas-for the Court to have
chosen the first alternative would have been to turn back the hands of
time. Its commendable choice of the second alternative creates a uniform,
equitable and much more easily understandable body of law to replace
what had been a totally unsatisfactory morass.
Louis W. PAYNE, JR.

Civil Rights-Section 1983 Action Lies for Gross and
Culpable Negligence
Section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 United States Code
section 1983,1 in recent years has been relied upon increasingly by individuals seeking redress for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights
under color of law. In Jenkins v. Averett,2 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has broadened the scope of conduct actionable under this
statute. Robert Jenkins, an 18-year-old black youth, was shot by a policeman in the course of a pursuit following a confrontation with some white
youths in Asheville, North Carolina. Jenkins brought suit in the United
States District Court to recover damages under section 1983, and for
50 Id. at 408.
142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) states:
Every person vho, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
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assault and battery under a pendent state claim. While Jenkins claimed
that the shooting-resulting in a six-inch hole in his thigh-was intentional, the officer testified that his gun fired accidentally as he returned
it to his holster.' The district court found that the shooting was not intentional, but did find that the policeman was grossly or culpably negligent.
Based on these findings, the court rejected the section 1983 claim but held
the defendant liable on the state cause of action.4
The court of appeals, in reversing the lower court's decision on the
section 1983 claim, held that the defendant's "reckless use of excessive
force" 5 amounted to a deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional right
to be free from injuries arbitrarily inflicted by the police.' Hence, grossly
or culpably negligent police action was found to be sufficiently arbitrary
for the purposes of the federal statute.
Although section 1983 is silent as to the type of conduct actionable
under its provisions, prior to Jenkins no recovery had been allowed for
anything less than intentional conduct. Indeed, the District Judge had
dimissed the federal claim in Jenkins because there was no finding of
intent, but allowed the state claim for assault and battery on the principle
that gross or culpable negligence, in lieu of intentional conduct, may be
actionable in North Carolina.7 Judge Sobeloff, writing for the majority,
reversed the district court and fashioned new federal law by asserting that
I The chase took place at night but on lighted streets. The youth ran with an
eighteen-inch tire tool stuck down his trousers leg and later held in his hand. The
policeman claimed that he thought it was a gun and that as soon as he realized his
error, he started to put his pistol away. The youth alleged that the policeman shot
him deliberately and that he had taken aim to fire a second time when another
policeman arrived, causing the defendant to put his gun away. Jenkins had neither
committed a crime nor was he subsequently charged with one.
'424 F.2d at 1231.
5 1d. at 1232.
' For examples of police abuse, see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1963).
"Thelower court's interpretation of North Carolina law is at best questionable.
The North Carolina cases cited by the court of appeals are the following: State
v. Eason, 242 N.C. 59, 86 S.E.2d 774 (1955); State v. Agnew, 202 N.C. 755, 164
S.E. 578 (1932); State v. Sudderth, 184 N.C. 753, 114 S.E. 828 (1922). These
decisions suggest that such might be the rule in criminal actions for assault and
battery. While it is not unreasonable to assume that the court might hold similarly
in civil actions, it has not done so yet. Only a few jurisdictions have so held: e.g.,
Lentine v. McAvoy, 105 Conn. 528, 136 A. 76 (1927) ; Lanbrecht v. Schreyer, 129
Minn. 271, 152 N.W. 645 (1915). Some jurisdictions have explicitly said that only
intentional acts would support the civil claim: e.g., Murray v. Modoc State Bank,
181 Kan. 642, 313 P.2d 304 (1957). Thus for the majority opinion to call the
proposition a "general rule," especially in civil actions in North Carolina, is misleading.
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if intent is required [for recovery under section 1983], it may be
supplied, for federal purposes, by gross and culpable negligence, just
as it was supplied in the common law cause of action.8
Presumably then, for future actions under section 1983, the type of conduct
involved in Jenkins-whether it be labeled as "wanton," "arbitrary," or
"recldess" 9-- may be substituted for the supposed requirement of intent.1
Jenkins is one of a series of cases that have wrestled to determine
the reach of section 1983. The seminal case in the interpretation of the
statute's motivational requirements was Monroe v. Pape':' in which the
Supreme Court held that one acting under color of state law need not

specifically intend a deprivation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights in
order to be liable. Thus, it would be sufficient that a defendant intentionally do the act which led to a deprivation. Prior to Monroe, some
courts had required that the defendant should have acted with specific
intent. This supposed requirement had been carried over from an earlier
Supreme Court decision in Screws v. United States, 2 an action based on
the criminal counterpart' s of section 1983, in which specific intent was held
to be an essential element. The Court in Monroe noted the difference in
statutory language; while the criminal statute requires that the defendant
willfully subject the plaintiff to a deprivation, that term does not appear
in the text of section 1983.
Most significant to later interpretations of section 1983 was the
observation in Monroe that "Section 1979 [now 1983] should be read
1424 F.2d at 1232 (emphasis added).
"Gross or culpable negligence" is an imprecise term, especially in North
Carolina. The court in Jenkins seems to use the term as a shorthand expression
of several other labels it put on the defendant's conduct: "reckless use of excessive
force"; "wanton conduct"; "arbitrary and gross abuse of police power"; and "raw
abuse of power." 424 F.2d at 1232.
10 North Carolina, as noted in Jenkins, also holds a policeman liable for criminal
assault if he "arbitrarily and grossly abuse[s] the power confided to him." State v.
Pugh, 101 N.C. 737, 740, 7 S.E. 757 (1888).
'

U.S. 167 (1961).
325 U.S. 91 (1945).

11365
1

" Now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964):
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments,
pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason
of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;
and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment of any term of years
or for life.
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against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for
the natural consequences of his actions."' 4 The broad language of the
Court would appear to authorize a claim for any type conduct recognized
under tort law principles-whether the claim be based on intent to do
wrong, gross negligence, or simple negligence. The Supreme Court's
invitation to expand the grasp of section 1983 has not brought a uniform
reaction from the courts. Some seem to have ignored it and looked for
different obstacles. Courts have held that the defendant must have acted
with a bad motive. 5 But other courts, in the spirit of Monroe, have
rejected the "bad motive" requirement.' 6 In Joseph v. Rowen 7 police
officers arrested the plaintiff without a search warrant and without probable cause; the plaintiff's claim was allowed under section 1983 even
though there was no showing that the police officers had acted malevolently. The court observed that nothing in the statute's language required
restriction to bad motive."8
Although Joseph exemplifies the expansive spirit of Monroe, the type
of conduct required of the defendant for a valid claim under section 1983
depends upon how broadly the courts are willing to interpret the Supreme Court's mandate. There appears to be a trend in the courts
toward requiring less sophisticated states of motivation, and after Jenkins,
there is precedent for bringing an action based on gross negligence.
Arguably, a logical extension of Monroe would be to allow recovery on
conduct amounting to simple negligence; however, in most cases brought
under section 1983, the possibility of negligent deprivation has not been
in issue since the acts complained of have been clearly intentional.' 9
Nevertheless, there have been attempts by prisoners in custody of a
1"'Monroe

v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).

" Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1963). In Beauregard v.
Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167, 183 (S.D. Cal. 1964), the court stated, "[i]n determining what constitutes lack of 'due process' we think that motive should and does
bear heavily in cases under Section 1983, 42 U.S.C.A. where police officers are involved .... " Accord, Bargainer v. Michal, 233 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
" E.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969) (and cases cited at 787).
1402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968), overruling Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d
529 (7th Cir. 1961).
" In those situations where good motive might be a defense to an action under
the federal statute, it is a defense only because the analagous comon law tort claim
would recognize it. 402 F.2d at 369.
"oE.g., Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963) (highway patrolman
blackjacked plaintiff after arrest for driving intoxicated) ; Jackson v. Martin, 261
F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Miss. 1966) (policeman allegedly shot plaintiff maliciously);
Brooks v. Moss, 242 F. Supp. 531 (W.D.S.C. 1965) (constable stopped car, assaulted
the driver without cause, then arrested him wrongfully).

1971]

1983 ACTION FOR GROSS NEGLIGENCE

state to sue under section 1983 for allegedly negligent medical attention."0
In Hopkins v. County of Cook,21 the court said that mere negligence
was not actionable under the statute. The disallowance of claims based
upon negligence in the prison situation reflects a judicial policy decision
to avoid ensnarlment in suits by prisoners grumbling about the management of their captivities.2 2 Although it has been intimated by one court
that in extreme circumstances improper care might form a basis for an
action under section 1983,2s it is unclear whether the court would require
conduct amounting to gross negligence or only simple negligence coupled
with exceptionally shocking results.
A district court has suggested that the logical end to the Monroe
rationale would indeed be an action founded on simple negligence. Dictum
in Huey v. Barloga24 indicates that negligent deprivations of constitutional
rights under color of state law are actionable under section 1983:
Section 1983 has been interpreted to provide a new type of tort:
the invasion, under color of law, of a citizen's constitutional rights.
It is also clear that it is not necessary that this invasion be intentional;
it may merely be negligent. 25

However, no court has yet gone as far as the court in Huey suggests is
possible. But Judge Bryan, dissenting in Jenkins, argues that "given the
scope the court now grants it, 1983 would indeed be all-pervasive."'
Despite the fears of Judge Bryan, Jenkins does not appear to herald
the day when claims resulting from simple negligence will be actionable
under section 1983. The federal courts are still looking for an intentional
act-or something that they consider, for federal purposes, as having
the same legal weight. The court in Jenkins makes clear that its "concern
" Jackson v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 422 F.2d 1272 (8th Cir. 1970)
(plaintiff claimed doctor and sheriff had not furnished nonnegligent professional
medical and surgical attention) ; United States ex rel. Gittlemackey v. Pennsylvania,
281 F. Supp. 175, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (plaintiff complained of improper medical
treatment).
21305 F. Supp. 1011, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1969). "It is an abuse of the Civil Rights
Act to characterize a charge of negligence or malpractice, properly questions of state
law, as a violation of constitutional rights."

"E.g., Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392, 393 (10th Cir. 1968), in which

the court stated that "[t]he internal affairs of prisons, including the discipline,
treatment, and care of prisoners are ordinarily the responsibility of the prison
administrators and are not subject to judicial review."
420, 421 n.3 (9th Cir. 1967).
" Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d
" 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
25 Id. at 872.
28424 F.2d at 1235.
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is with the raw abuse of power by a police officer.., and not with
simple negligence on the part of a policeman or any other official."-' The
decision to reject section 1983 claims based on simple negligence is not an
irrational line drawing. Assuming that the purpose of the statute is punitive and corrective, as well as compensatory, 28 courts are not unreasonable to require that the defendant should have intended to do the act
resulting in the deprivation-or at least to have behaved so recklessly or
arbitrarily that the courts will view his actions with the same level of indignation heretofore reserved for intentional deprivations. Simple negligence, even when resulting in the deprivation of constitutional rights,
does not carry the same weight of culpability.
The Jenkiw decision turns heavily on the factual situation. The court
does not suggest a 'eddily apparent standard for the type of conduct now
required for a section 1983 action, other than "gross or culpable negligence"-a particularly imprecise concept. One suspects that the decision
is a visceral one-more emotional than objective.2 Its utility in future
litigation will depend upon how readily a future court is shocked by the
circumstances of the case then before it.
ELMER LISTON BISHOP, III
...

Constitutional Law-Exemption of Church Property From Taxation
Since the birth of the nation, Congress and the states have afforded
religious organizations a favored status under tax legislation.' An important example of that benevolence is the universal practice of exempting
from ad valorem taxation property owned by religious organizations and
u§ed exclusively for religious purposes. 2 Walz v. Tax Commission of City
27Id.

at 1232.

'8 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-87 (1961).
' Notice, for example, the considerable space Judge Sobeloff gives to recounting
the rather remarkable testimony given at the trial. 424 F.2d at 1230-31.
'See, e.g., Stimson, The Exemption of Churches from Taxation, 18 TAXES 361
(4940); Zollman, Tax Exemptions of American Church Property, 14 Micir. L.
Rzv. 646 (1916); Note, Constitutionality of the Real Property Church Exemption,
3.6 BRooKLYN L. Rnv. 430 (1970).
'A representative provision is N.C. CoxsT. art. 5, § 5. State constitutional and
statutory provisions for the property tax exemptions are collected in Van Alstyne,
Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 461 (1959); Note, The
Establishment Dilemma: Exemption of Religio sly Used Property, 4 SUFFOLx L.
REV. 533 (1970).
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of New York3 has resolved the much debated issue4. of whether such exemptions necessarily violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. 5
They do not. This note examines Walz in terms of its relation to the
precedent under the establishment clause, and the impact the decision may
have upon the future of that clause.
Appellant Walze sought to enjoin the exemption from ad valorem taxes
of property owned by religious organizations and used solely for religious
worship, arguing that the exemptions indirectly required him to make
a contribution to religious groups. In New York, exemptions for such
property, as well as for a broad class of property including nonprofit
educational and charitable facilities, are required by a statute implementing a provision of the state constitution.8
It is hardly surprising that the Court upheld the New York exemptiofi.
Twice before, the Court had been presented the issue 'on appeals from
state court decisions sustaining religious exemptions and had dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question.' No prior Court decisions holding
The pecuniary importance of the property exemption is illustrated by the fact

that the exempted church property in New York City is valued at 692,000,000

dollars. The revenue gained from taxation of that property at the prevailing fiscal
1969 rate would have been 35,000,000 dollars. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1969, at 1,
col. 6.
- 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
'E.g., Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for Religiom Activities, in THE WALL BETwEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95 (D. Oaks ed. 1963); Bittker,
Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969).
'U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...."
6
Itis possible that Walz bought his twenty-two by twenty-nine foot Staten
Island lot, valued at one hundred dollars and on which the annual property tax is
five dollars and twenty-four cents, to qualify as a taxpayer having standing to bring
the suit. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
The statute provides in pertinent part:
Real property owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for
religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary,
educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical
society, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes . . .and used
exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes ...
shall be exempt fom taxation as provided in this section.
N.Y.
REAL. PROP. TAX LAW §420(1) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
8 N.Y. CoxsT. art. 16, § 1.
'General Fin. Corp. v. Archetto, 93 R.I. 392, 176 A.2d 73 (1961), appeal
dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644,
298 P.2d. 1, appeal dismissed sub nom., Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S

921 (1956).
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legislation unconstitutional were in point. New York had not singled out
churches for special treatment, but had included them in a broad class of
exemptees. 1° The historical fact of long practice weighed heavily in favor
of a constitutional interpretation sustaining the exemption. Possibly, the
Court was not unmindful of the vituperative public reaction that followed
the school prayer cases" and wished to avoid a similar spectacle. Although
the decision could be viewed as virtually "preordained," it is nevertheless significant, for in reaching its result the Court rejected some of the
earlier establishment clause reasoning, and at the same time retained,
expanded, and fashioned some anew.
2
the Court transformed the estabIn Everson v. Board of Education4

lishment clause from an apparition into a reality when it applied that
clause to the states through the fourteenth amendment and yet upheld the
practice of reimbursing parents for the costs of transporting their children
to public and nonprofit private schools, including sectarian schools. In
Everson the Court made the classic statement of the establishment clause
limitations:
oSee note 7 supra. The breadth and character of the groups afforded preferred
treatment could be especially important factual variants. Problems of statutory
construction are thoroughly discussed in Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church
Property, 20 OHio ST. L.J. 461 (1959).
Of particular interest are the issues of whether the courts may and in what
manner they should or must define the term "religious" in the exemption statutes.
See Rabin, When is a Religiouis Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and
the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231 (1966); Comment, Defining
Religion: Of God, the Constitution, and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 533
(1965); Note, Qualifying for State and Federal Religions Statutory Exemptions,
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 249.
Must a group whose avowed tenets are atheistic but which otherwise has the
characteristics of a church be numbered among the "religious" exemptees? The
majority in Walz did not speak to the problem. In his concurring opinion in Walv,
justice Harlan assumed that the New York statute did extend the exemption to
such groups and therefore satisfied the requirement of government neutrality
between religion and nonreligion. 397 U.S. at 697. justice Douglas, the lone
dissenter in Wale, felt that the statute did not include such groups, resulting in aid
to organized believers but denying it to non-believers, whether organized or not,
in violation of governmental neutrality. 397 U.S. at 700. Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970), and Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), may have
revealed the Court's general approach to this issue. Those cases involved construction of the term "religious training and belief" in the statutory provision for
exemption of conscientious objectors from combatant service in the Universal
Military Training and Service Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. APP. 456(j) (1964).
11 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel
infra. For an account of the public
-. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See p.
reaction to those decisions see Kurland, The School Prayer Cases, in Tnz WALL
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 142 (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
18330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.... No tax in any
amount, large or small, can -belevied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called ....Is
Thus the Court settled the long-standing debate over whether the establishment clause was intended to proscribe only governmental preference of one
religion over another, or governmental advancement of all religions as
well, and couched its interpretation of the clause in absolute language.
In keeping with the strict "no aid to religion" principle, the watchwords
of early establishment cases were "separation of church and state."1 In
later cases the Court recognized, and in Walz it strongly reiterated, that
this constitutional goal of separation cannot mean absence of all contact, 5
and the absolute "no aid" principle was abandoned-properly so, it would
seem, since such an approach had proved unsuitable in other areas of
constitutional law. 16
Board of Education of Abington Township v. Schempp'7 marked a
significant step in the evolution of establishment clause standards. In
Schempp the Court held that a state may not require readings of Bible
verses or recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools and restated the
establishment clause test as follows:
[W]hat [is] the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If either
is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
18

Id. at 15-16.
1,Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ; Everson v.Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
at 676.
"8r 397
E.g.,U.S.
in Ogden
v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), all but one of
the Justices agreed that the contract clause, "No State shall... pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts," U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §10, imposed an
absolute ban. See Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 1), 57
H.Av.L. Rnv. 512, 533 (1944). Thereafter, in some cases, the Court engaged in
the dubious enterprise of creating state contract law and reading implied conditions
into contracts in order to uphold some statutes and yet preserve this absolute principle. Id. (pt. 3), 852, 872-73. This awkward position was abandoned, and the
modern view puts it "beyond question that the prohibition is not an absolute one
and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula." City of
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965).
" 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.18
Under the Schempp test, the validity of legislation turned on mere formthe manner in which aid to religion came about, rather than the magnitude
of the aid. In Wag, the Court did not adopt the Schempp test,"0 and once
again one may find striking parallels in other areas of constitutional law
in which distinctions based on form were ultimately rejected.2"
In some establishment cases the Court had relied on the secularization
of religious institutions to sustain governmental advancement of them.2 '
"Blue laws" requiring Sunday closing were upheld upon the Court's finding that although they were originally enacted to serve religion, the
prevailing modem use of Sunday justified their continuance to advance
the secular state goal of providing a day of recreation and respite from
labor. 22 In Walz the Court specifically rejected a similar justification of
23
the exemption based on performance of secular social services by churches.
In Everson, while admitting that reimbursing parents for the transportation costs helped children get to sectarian schools, the majority of
Id. at 222.
The Schempp test was adopted in substantially the same form and applied in
the establishment cases decided by the Court after Schernpp and before Wala. See
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (a state may not prohibit the teaching
in the public schools of the theory that man evolved from lower orders of life, at
least when it is clear that the purpose of the statute is to prevent contradiction
of the traditional Biblical account of man's creation); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968) (a state may "lend" secular textbooks to children attending
sectarian schools).
20
E.g., Congressional power under the commerce clause to regulate intrastate
activities was once held not to extend to those activities having only an indirect
effect on interstate commerce. The Court's view was that "[t]he distinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns, not upon the magnitude of either the
cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has been
brought about," and that "[i]t is quite true that rules of law are sometimes qualified
by considerations of degree .... [b]ut the matter of degree has no bearing upon
the question here .... ." Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936). That
view was later rejected; "questions of the power of Congress are not to be decided
by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such
as.. 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the actual effect of the activity .... "
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). Now such an activity may be regiflated "if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce," regardless
of whether that effect is direct or indirect or how local in nature the activity is.
Id. SE.g.,
at 125. if sectarian
school education had not become secularized, the reimbursement of transportation costs in Everson would have taken on the quality of providing
transportation to church services.
2 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1961).
28 397 U.S. at 674.
19
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five was careful to characterize the aid as being to parents rather than to
church schools.4 In Board of Educationv. Allen,2 the Court applied the
Schempp "purpose and effect" test to uphold the practice of lending textbooks to sectarian school children on "formal request" by the children.
The books were chosen by the sectarian schools and approved by public
school authorities. In Allen, the Court insisted that "[no] books are
furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents
and children, not to schools." 2 Walz recharacterized Everson and Allen
and cited their facts in support of its result; the Everson transportation
costs and the Allen books were said surely to have constituted "aid" to
the sponsoring churches, and, in the Allen case, relieved "those churches
of an enormous aggregate cost for those books. ' '27 Building on this view,
the Court failed to see how the "broader range of police and fire protection given equally to all churches, along with nonprofit hospitals, art
galleries, and libraries . . .

is different for purposes of the Religion

Clauses."2 8

Thus it is clear that the Court will not invalidate legislation
for the sole reason that it results in very substantial aid to religion, and,
accordingly, the Court no longer feels compelled to cover up the fact of
that substantial aid by calling it something else.
The Court retained only the skeleton of the establishment clause test
that existed prior to Walz. In initially defining the limits of governmental power, the Court stated that "[e]ach value judgment under the
Religion Clauses must... turn on whether particular acts in question are
intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have
the effect of doing so."" This broad and general guideline does not, without more, add significantly to precise consideration of establishment issues,
since in that regard it merely begs the question. However, it is noteworthy that the Court framed this test in terms of the "Religion Clauses."
Discussion on the relationship of the establishment and free exercise clauses
is scarce in earlier opinons, but the opinion in Walz is replete with references to that relationship" and at least indicates that the Court has begun
to consider the clauses together.
2,330 U.S. at 18.
--392 U.S. 236 (1968).
2

11Id. at 243-44.

U.S. at 671-72.
21397
2
-8Id. at 671.
"Old. at 669.

'oE.g., "The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Re-

ligion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Id. at 668-69.
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When the Court applied the "purpose" phase of the test, it found that
the purpose of the exemption was neither advancement nor inhibition
of religion. Instead, the purpose was said to be simply to spare a broad
class of nonprofit organizations, including religious groups, that "foster the
moral or mental improvement" of and are beneficial and stabilizing influences in the community from the burden of taxation levied upon private
profit institutions. 1
In applying the "effect" phase of the test, the Court stated it to be
"inescapably one of degree." Past decisions have indicated that the establishment clause test is properly one of degree,82 although that theme was
not then developed. Adoption of a degree test seems entirely appropriate,
especially when it has proved workable in other areas of constitutional
law. 33 Yet after determining that an excessive degree of something
is impermissible, the question remains, of what? In Walz, the Court
answered, "excessive governmental entanglement with religion."3 4 Indeed, "entanglement" and "involvement" appear to have become new
watchwords.
The Court analyzed the exemption issue by comparing the exemption
with the alternative of taxation. Exemption, although resulting in an
indirect economic benefit, was said to occasion far less "involvement"
by avoiding tax valuation of church property, tax liens, and so forth;
furthermore, exemption was not viewed as sponsorship since the state does
not transfer part of its funds to the church. Unfortunately, the Court's
analysis on this point is obscure. The sort of involvement avoided by the
exemption could hardly lead to an establishment of religion; even disregarding the financial burden, the inconvenience to the church caused by
the taxation process is much more relevant to the free exercise clatuse. Of
course, the free exercise clause can limit the operation of the establish1Id. at 672.
While specifically declining to justify the exemption because of the secular
services performed by churches, the Court accepted the New York legislative determination that along with the other exemptees, religious organizations qua religious
organizations contribute to the secular goals of fostering the "moral or mental improvement" and stabilization of the community. Thus it appears that for the first
time in an establishment case the Court has given specific recognition to what Professor Giannella has called a "secularly relevant religious factor," and seems to accept
the notion that the advancement of religion per se always advances some permissible
secular goals to some extent. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishlmnt,
and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARv. L. Rnv. 513, 528 (1968).
" E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
" See note 20 supra.
3'397 U.S. at 674.
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ment clause, and has freequently been held to require government to create
special exceptions in favor of religion. 35 It is possible and seems probable, that, although it did not specifically so state, the Court was enaging
in a balancing of the interference with the "free exercise" of religion
that would result from taxation against whatever "establishment" or
advancement results from exemption. 6
It is also possible that the Court has embraced quantitative minimization of church-state involvement3 7 as an independent factor in the
establishment clause or religion clauses test. It appears from the Walz
opinion that a statute conditioning tax exemption on performance of
secular services by the church would not find favor with the Court. 8s Of
course, performance of such services would be a burden on the church,
and the imposition of that burden could conceivably run afoul of the
free exercise clause. However, the Court's position seems to be that even
if the burden of performance was negligible, the application of such a
statute to churches would nevertheless be unconstitutional solely because
of the church-state involvement precipitated. It is true that such a statute
would visit some slight burden on the church due to the inconvenience
of documented conformity, but the Court leaves unclear whether it is this
consideration or the mere fact of the involvement, the church-state con"E.g., in Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), the Court held that a
town could not impose its license fee for the selling of books on a Jehovah's
Witness minister for whom the selling of religious literature was a religious exercise and source of living income.
" In other parts of the opinion, the Court did talk in terms of the "Religion
Clauses." See note 30 supra. The Court did say that the exemption tends to
complement and reinforce the desired separation, but did not clarify whether it is
the operation of the free exercise clause that makes the separation desirable in this
instance. 397 U.S. at 676.
"' The phrase "quantitative minimization of church-state involvement" is intended to denote diminution of church-state intercourse and entanglement of the
state in activities of the church without regard to its quality, kind, effect, etc. An
extreme and absurd example would be denial of police and fire protection to the
church because of the "involvement" occasioned by affording the protection.
"The Court found it not only unnecessary but also undesirable to justify the
exemption on the social welfare service performed by churches. In the Court's
words,
[t]o give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the work of religious bodies
would introduce an element of governmental evaluation and standards as
to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of
continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to
avoid. Hence, the use of a social welfare yardstick as a significant element
to qualify for tax exemption could conceivably rise to confrontations that
could escalate to constitutional dimensions.
397 U.S. at 674.
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tact, that could require condemnation of the statute. Minimization of
church-state involvement and entanglement is properly an independent
consideration, since even neutral involvement, in which the church is
treated neither favorably nor unfavorably because it is the church, may
be so direct or intense as to draw the church into the political arena and
invite strife and "political division on religious lines."8 Hopefully, however, the Court is not unwittingly heading towards a reversion culminating
with quantitative minimization of church-state involvement as the controlling factor. The Court has already rejected quantitative maximization
of separation of church and state as the only constitutional goal, 40 and
should similarly limit the role of this, its obverse.
The "purpose" element of the test seems open to question. A legislative
purpose to advance religion is in some instances easily concealed, especially
in the tax field. Professor Bittker has pointed out that taxation statutes
can be drafted so as to avoid positive exemptions and therefore the use
of such words as "religion" as a basis for classification. 41 Other potential
problems with the examination of legislative purpose are illustrated by
Zorach v. Clauson,42 in which the Court sustained the practice of releasing
children from public schools on parental request to attend religious instruction classes without the school grounds. School attendance was otherwise compulsory; those children not leaving the school for religious instruction were required to remain at the school. The Court declared this
program to be a permissible state accommodation of its public school
schedule to religious activities.43 If faced with the Zorack facts again,
although the "effect" of the program is clearly the advancement of religion,
the Court could simply hold that it is not such to an unconstitutional
degree. But who could deny that the "purpose" of the program is the
establishment of religion, or at least the advancement of religion? If the
Zorach result were to be reached again, it would appear that the Court
would either have to strike the purpose inquiry from the test or fashion
some sort of degree scale for determining permissible legislative purpose.
" "[P]olitical division on religious lines is one of the principal evils that the
first amendment sought to forestall." Freund, Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82
HAv. L. REv. 1680, 1692 (1969). In his concurring opinion in Wale, Justice
Harlan adopted and applied the factor of minimization of church-state involvement
as the third element in a tripartite test also imposing "voluntarism" and "neutrality"
requirements. 397 U.S. at 695.
40

See p. 345 supra.

'1 Bittker, Churches, Taxes, and the Constitution, 78
(1969).
42343 U.S. 306 (1952).
,8 Id. at 315.

YALE

L.J. 1285, 1293
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Perhaps the best means of obviation of these difficulties is also the
simplest-elimination of the purpose inquiry. After all, one wonders why
even the most fastidious atheist would object to a statute, the admitted
purpose of which is the establishment of an official religion, but which is
wholly ineffectual to accomplish that result.
Since the Court did not summarily dispose of the exemption issue
as it apparently could have," it would seem that it considered Walz to be
an appropriate vehicle for definitive exposition of its views on the establishment clause. Walz does indicate that the Court will use the free exercise
clause and a degree test to limit the operation of the establishment clause,
especially when the "aid," albeit substantial, is afforded equally to all
religions. Adoption of a degree test was an appropriate step towards more
refined consideration of establishment issues, but the unfortunate use of
church-state "involvement" per se, without clarification, as the measure of the validity of the exemption has not contributed to that goal,
and it still remains for the Court to do what it has already said the first
amendment does with respect to church-state relations-"studiously [define] the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or
45
union or dependency one on the other.
R. B.

TUCKER, JR.

Criminal Procedure-Application of the Doctrine of Collateral
Estoppel to State Criminal Prosecutions
In Ashe v. Swenson' the Supreme Court has constitutionally required a
variation of the civil law doctrine of collateral estoppel for state criminal
trials.' The Court defined collateral estoppel as the principle that "when
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot be litigated between the same parties in any
"See p. - & note 9 supra.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
1

397 U.S. 436 (1970).

estoppel, as required in criminal cases is distinguishable in two
ways from that traditionally applied in the civil law. First, the requirement of
mutuality-that a party cannot benefit from the doctrine unless he would be bound
by it if the opposite result had been reached-is not carried over into the criminal
law. Second, the general verdict of a criminal trial requires some speculation as
to its basis that the special verdict of the civil trial often does not. For a good discussion of the problems of mutuality and the general verdict see Note, Collateral
Estoppel in Crimilal Cases, 28 U. GCEi. L. R v. 142 (1960).
2Collateral
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lawsuit." 3

future
This note will explore the justification for, and the
ramifications of, the adoption of collateral estoppel as a constitutional
requirement in state criminal trials.
Ashe was charged with six separate counts of armed robbery arising
out of his alleged participation, with three others, in the armed robbery of
six members of a single poker game. Ashe was first tried on one of those
counts, for the robbery of one of the victims, and the jury, although not
instructed to elaborate on its verdict, found him not guilty by reason of
insufficient evidence. The only contested issue at that trial was the
identity of Ashe as one of the robbers; and the prosecution witnesses,
four of the six victims, gave weak testimony on this point.4
Six weeks later Ashe was tried on a second count for the robbery of
another of the victims. At this trial the prosecution witnesses gave much
stronger testimony,3 and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction denying Ashe's plea of
former jeopardy;' Ashe then brought a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
The district court denied the writ,7 the court of appeals affirmed,8 and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' Justice Stewart,
writing the Court's opinion, held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
was inherent in the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy
and, therefore, enforceable against the states.10 Justice Stewart said that
the single issue determined in the first trial was that there was reasonable
doubt that Ashe was one of the robbers and that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel prevented the state from retrying this issue in the second trial.
In the single dissent Chief Justice Burger argued that collateral
estoppel is not inherent in the fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy, remarking that if it is, it has eluded judges and justices for
* 397

U.S. at 443.

' One of the witnesses said Ashe sounded much like one of the robbers, and
another identified Ashe by his size and actions. Two of the prosecution witnesses
thought there had only been three robbers and were unable to identify Ashe as one
of them. Id. at 438.
'Two witnesses who had been unable to identify Ashe now said his features
matched those of one of the robbers. Id. at 440.
' State v. Ashe, 350 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1961).
Ashe v. Swenson, 289 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
8
Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968).
'Ashe v. Swenson, 393 U.S. 1115 (1969).
10397
U.S. at 445. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Supreme
Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is enforceable
against the states through the fourteenth amendment. In a companion case to
Benton, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the Court accorded full
retroactivity to the Benton doctrine.
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two centuries and that collateral estoppel is not applicable in the Ashe fact
pattern because the basis of the jury's verdict is not readily determinable.
The Chief Justice visualized the guesswork required to discern the verdict's basis, when all the court has before it is a general verdict from a
jury allowed to reach inconsistent results, as an inherent and fatal weakness in the use of collateral estoppel in criminal trials.
The United States Supreme Court had earlier wrestled with the
problem of collateral estoppel in criminal prosecutions both in supervisory
review over the federal courts and constitutional review over the state
courts." Justice Stewart pointed out in Ashe that collateral estoppel is
an established principle in federal criminal law. 2 However, when previously confronted with a fact pattern almost identical to that in Ashe, the
Court had implied in Hoag v. New Jersey'" that collateral estoppel was
not a doctrine of constitutional proportions. 4 The Court purported to
explain the inconsistency of Ashe and Hoag by saying, "The doctrine of
Benton ... puts the issues in a perspective quite different from that in
which the issues were perceived in Hoag v. New Jersey. The question
is no longer whether collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process,
but whether it is a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double
jeopardy."' 15
Justice Stewart cites no authority for the proposition that collateral
estoppel is embodied in the fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy and dismissed this question by stating, "Whether its [collateral
estoppel's] basis was a constitutional one was a question of no more than
academic concern until this Court's decision in Benton v. Maryland."'6
Indeed, the cases Justice Stewart cited as authority for his statement that
collateral estoppel is an established rule of federal law seem to consider
1

I supervisory review over the federal courts the Supreme Court required
1n
collateral estoppel in United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916), and held
it could be used even with a general verdict in Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S.
575 (1948). The court of appeals held that lack of mutuality would not be a bar
to the use of collateral estoppel in United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1961). In constitutional review over the state courts the Supreme Court refused
to require collateral estoppel in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
12 397

U.S. at 443.

'a356 U.S. 464 (1958).
1
"The Supreme Court said that "[d]espite its wide employment, we entertain
grave doubts whether collateral estoppel can be regarded as a constitutional requirement. Certainly this court has never so held." Id. at 471. The decision, however,
was based on other grounds.
2r

10

397 U.S. at 442.

d. at 446-47 n.10.
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collateral estoppel and the fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy as separate doctrines. In United States v. Oppenheimert 7 the
Court said, regarding collateral estoppel, that "the Fifth Amendment
was not intended to do away with what in the civil law is a fundamental
principle of justice .... -18 In Sealfon v. United States' the Court
granted the petitioner relief on grounds of collateral estoppel after he had
abandoned his plea of double jeopardy. This implies a difference in the
doctrines. In the other major case cited by Justice Stewart, United States
v. Kramer,20 the court also construed the fifth amendment's double
jeopardy protection and collateral estoppel as separate doctrines. 2 Thus
there is at least some basis for Chief Justice Burger's complaint that the
Court is taking a step in constitutional law on no more than a feeling that
retrialof issues has the same double "run [ning of] the gantlet"2 2 effect that
the fifth amendment guarantees against for retrial of offenses.
In examining the policy considerations involved in deciding whether
the Court was correct in adopting collateral estoppel as a requirement for
the states, it is important to stress one thing at the outset. The question
is not which policy is fairest or most efficacious; but rather it is, in light
of our federal system, which policy is required by the Constitution.
However, the Court does have considerable leeway in deciding whether
collateral estopel is "embodied" in the fifth amendment, and in this light
it is important to consider what might influence a decision based on this
question.
In Ashe the Court wanted to prevent a state prosecutor from using
the separate crimes involved in a multiple-victim situation to give the
state an advantage over the defendant. Justice Stewart said:
[The state] treated the first trial as no more than a dry run for the
second prosecution: "No doubt the prosecutor felt the state had a
provable case on the first charge and, when he lost ... he refined his
17242
U.S. 85 (1916).
18

Id. at 88.

'-

332 U.S. 575 (1948).

2 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961).

"Kramer appeals from the District Court's overruling of his contention
that the Connecticut judgment barred a later prosecution under the clause
of the Fifth Amendment forbidding that "any person be subject for the same

offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb," and, alternatively, that

it precluded the Government from relitigating issues necessarily determined

in the earlier trial. We hold the District Court was right as to the former,
wrong as to the latter.
Id. at 912.
22397

U.S. at 465.
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trial." But this is
presentation in light of the turn of events at the first
23
precisely what the constitutional guarantee forbids.
Certainly, the prevention of intentional harassment of defendants is a
worthwhile objective. To what extent will collateral estoppel achieve this
objective? An analysis of the holding in Ashe shows that its protection
is not as far reaching as it sounds. The Court held that when a defendant
has been acquitted of one crime arising from a multiple-victim transaction,
and the facts of the case shows the reasons for the jury's decision are unarguably clear, 24 the states will be precluded from relitigation of these
previously decided points. From this statement of the holding we can see
that collateral estoppel would be of no benefit to a defendant if (a) the
first trial resulted in a conviction; (b) the conclusion of the jury could not
be readily determined, as would be the case if Ashe had contested the issue
of whether a robbery in fact took place as well as whether he was one of
the perpetrators of it; or (c) the issue decided in the first trial was not
conclusive as to the offense in the second trial. For example, if the first
jury had based the acquittal on a finding that nothing was taken from
the victim, this would not prevent a second trial on the question of
whether anything was taken from a different victim. Also, there are several different types of offenses that can result in multiple crimes, and the
protection given to Ashe in the multiple-victim case might not be accorded
to a defendant accused of a different type of multiple crime. In a recent
case, United States v. Fusco,25 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held, citing Ashe, that collateral estoppel would apply to prevent
subsequent prosecution for crimes distinct in terminology. After Fusco's
conviction for theft was reversed on appeal without remand,2 6 his subsequent conviction for possession of the stolen goods was reversed because "It]he ultimate fact of Fusco's involvement ... already had been
determined .... ,2 Another area of subsequent prosecutions, one which
was mentioned in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Ashe, was that
of subsequent prosecutions for crimes that are separable chronologically.
In the celebrated case of Johnson v. Commonwealth,28 seventy-five poker
2 Id. at 447.
"' The Court found that the reason the jury found Ashe not guilty in the first
trial could only have been that they believed he was not one of the participants. Id.
at 446.
"427 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1970).
2'398 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1968).
2 427 F.2d at 363.
"201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923).
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hands were held to be seventy-five separate offenses of gambling. It does
not follow that collateral estoppel would be applicable in this situation
because one hand of poker may not, due to an absence of betting for
example, have reached the statutory level of gambling while the next
hand may have.29
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, concurred
with Justice Stewart's majority opinion that collateral estoppel should
apply but added that the doctrine of double jeopardy alone should bar the
subsequent conviction. The fifth amendment provides, in part: "nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb .

. . .""

In determining what constitutes the same offense the

Court has looked to the "same evidence" test--if different evidence is
required, the offenses are different. Justice Brennan insisted that the "same
transaction" test should be substituted and that any crimes arising from a
single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction should be treated
as the same offense for fifth amendment purposes. 2
Would Justice Brennan's "same transaction" test go further than the
collateral estoppel rule in preventing harassment of defendants by multiple
trials? Undoubtedly, yes. If the double jeopardy theory is followed, there
could be no subsequent trials when the basis of the jury's first acquittal
was unclear or even when the first trial resulted in a conviction. A type
of merger would operate because the double jeopardy theory would prevent
retrial of any part of the single transaction. Even though the "same transaction" test for double jeopardy would prevent most of the harassment of
defendants by multiple trials, there are still valid reasons for opposing its
adoption. It is not clear that this rule would work completely to the
defendant's advantage. There are certainly situations where the defendant
2 9An interesting area for expansion of collateral estoppel as used in criminal
law appears in the multiple-criminal cases. The Supreme Court has said that the
lack of mutuality poses no problem for the use of collateral estoppel. 397 U.S. at
443. Does it not follow that it should not have to be the same party pleading the
estoppel? If two defendants are charged with auto theft, and the sole issue in the
trial of the first was whether the prosecuting witness had given permission to use
the car, should not the second defendant be able to rely on an acquittal of the first
defendant
to estop the state from relitigation of the issue of permission?
0
"

U.S. CONsT. amend. V (emphasis added).

" Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
397 U.S. at 453-54. Justice Harlan concurred with the majority opinion in

32

Ashe but made the specific reservation that the decision was not to include the
adoption of the "same transaction" test advanced by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion. Id. at 448.
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would prefer not to have the whole transaction tried in one trial.m Society's interest in convicting the guilty also must be weighed. Perhaps we
do not want always to force prosecutors to try defendants for multiple
crimes in a single trial. The possibility of cross issues and confusion in
particularly complex crimes is apparent. The example of a man killing his
wife and her paramour in a moment of passion, killing his neighbors
'because they witnessed the first crime, and killing someone else because
he had become insane from all this killing is an unlikely one; but it does
show that it is possible for what might be considered a single transaction
with only one defendant to have some very complex issues involved.
In considering the equities involved in multiple trials the individualist
might point to the freedom of choice on the defendant's part. Essentially,
it is the defendant who decides to commit multiple crimes, and viewed
from this perspective one might say that he is subjecting himself to the
possibility of multiple trials." While the Ashe fact pattern does not present a very appealing case for the idea of choice because we view the
decision as one of robbing a "game," is it really unfair to require a
defendant accused of individually and willfully murdering four bank tellers
during a robbery to come to trial four times? Some crimes are essentially
more like a single transaction than others. This may be more of an
emotional than a rational distinction, but it does seem less unfair to have
multiple trials in the bank teller situation than the Ashe situation. Also,
a problem will arise in defining what is and what is not a "single transaction." If a man is accused of passing five hundred bad checks in the past
year, fifty in the past month, ten yesterday, and five in one hour yesterday, there seems to be no rational distinction for calling one part of that
series a single transaction and not another. If Justice Brennan wants the
" For example, in a trial for rape and robbery, a defendant may well feel that
his chances of being acquitted for either of these offenses would be greatly reduced
by a decision in the mind of the jury that he was guilty of the other. There also
may be a fear on the part of an innocent defendant that a jury, confronted with
several counts arising from a single transaction, may compromise by finding him
guilty of some and innocent of others. Finally, the defendant may fear that the
jury members may harbor the feeling that with all these charges against him, he
must have done something.
"' This analysis is subject to the criticism that it presupposes guilt and does not
take into account the plight of the innocent defendant confronted with multiple
trials. Indeed, it does allow for hardship on the part of the innocent defendant
when there is great evidence against him. However, the requirement of only
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" reflects the belief that a workable system will
involve some such hardship. The innocent defendant with less proof against him
will probably not be brought to trial a second time simply as a matter of prosecutorial
discretion.
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defendant to be tried for all crimes known to the prosecutor when the
defendant is brought to trial, then the problem of complexity mentioned
before will 'be greatly magnified.
These reasons for opposing the adoption of the "same transaction"
test for double jeopardy apply, though with considerably less force, to
the adoption of collateral estoppel. It must be remembered, though, that
collateral estoppel has considerably less effect in curing the abuse of
harassment through multiple trials. However, collateral estoppel has a
preventive side that the total cure-the "same transaction" test for
double jeopardy-does not need. The prosecutor will be forced to try
the defendant for all of the crimes involved in a single transaction because
he cannot know beforehand what will result during the first trial. If he
first .brings the defendant to trial for only one crime in an attempt to feel
out the defense and test his approach, he may well be estopped from
proving a point vital to his prosecution in the subsequent trial for another
of the crimes. Where, heretofore, a multiple-crime transaction has given
the prosecutor virtually a free try at the defendant in which he could
discover the defenses and polish up his case, at least now the prosecutor
k nows that further trials may be foreclosed by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
After consideration of the policies involved, the result in Ashe appears
to have been the best alternative. The application of collateral estoppel
should result in better prepared prosecutions and less harassment of
defendants without some of the risks of the almost total exclusion of
multiple trials required by the adoption of the "same transaction" test
for determining double jeopardy.
BRUCE J. DOWNEY, III

Federal Courts-Choice of Controlling Law in Cases Involving
Federally Insured Mortgages
In a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, United States v.
Stadium Apartments, Inc.,' the court held that the Federal Housing
" Calling this a free try does, however, ignore the fact that the prosecution has
lost the opportunity to get additional punishment for the additional crime; but the
common practice of concurrent running of the sentences in an Ashe situation com-

bined with the small likelihood that a prosecutor, having secured one conviction,
would bring prosecutions on the other crimes minimizes this distinction.
'425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Authority was not subject to a state redemption statute. Stadium Apartments secured an FHA insured loan from the Prudential Insurance Company; the mortgage included a provision waiving any right to redemption "to the extent permitted by law."2 Stadium Apartments defaulted,
and Prudential assigned the mortgage to the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development who paid Prudential the amount due. The United
States secured by default judgment a foreclosure decree that, despite the
waiver provision, included a one-year redemption period as provided by
Idaho statute. The government appealed, arguing that the waiver of
redemption clause should have been upheld.
The court of appeals, finding the applicable law to be federal3 and
the state law regarding redemption not to have been adopted as the
federal rule,4 reversed the portion of the lower court decision providing for
a period of redemption. 5 The dissent argued that deep-rooted equitable
redemptive rights were being cast aside in an unnecessary intrusion into
the legitimate local affairs of the states.6 While accepting "the assumption
that federal law is controlling," the dissent felt that effect should be given
"to the pertinent and equitable state law by incorporating it into the
federal program." 7
In deciding which law will apply when faced with a situation similar"
2
Id. at
3

359.
Id. at 360, citing United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
'425 F.2d at 367. The court felt that the adoption of the state's definition of first
mortgage was for commercial convenience and did not constitute an adoption of the

state law regarding the remedy. Id. at 361. Further the FHA was not viewed as
having adopted the state redemption statute by its regulations. Id. at 361-62.
Finally the court declined to adopt the local law of redemption itself, citing protection of the federal treasury, need for a uniform policy regarding FHA insured
loans, and prevention of administrative cost and difficulty as policy reasons against
adoption. Id. at 362-67.
5
Id. at 367.
° Id. at 367-68.
"Id. at 368. The dissent saw neither controlling precedent nor so great a burden
on the FHA in destroying uniformity or threatening the treasury that the state
redemption rule should not be adopted by the federal courts. Id. at 371.
'See, e.g., United States v. Merrick Sponsor Corp., 421 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir.
1970), a recent case in which the court applied federal law to uphold the government's interest in an FHA insured loan despite a contrary state statute. After
Merrick Sponsor Corporation defaulted and the mortgage was assigned to the
Federal Housing Commissioner, the United States secured a foreclosure decree

authorizing a deficiency judgment. The deficiency judgment was awarded on motion

by the United States 133 days after the delivery of the deed despite a state statute
requiring such a motion to be made within ninety days. Id. at 1078. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the deficiency judgment, holding the question to
be one of federal law under which there was no requirement or suggestion that the
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to that in Stadium Apartments, the court must face two questions.9 First,
is there authority for federal law to apply? If this is answered in the
affirmative, then the second question is reached. Should the federal court
adopt the state law as the federal rule?1 These separate questions have
been explicitly acknowledged by some courts.'1 Others, however, have
expressly declined to treat the questions separately,'12 leaving it "not clear
whether the court must apply state law, or whether it merely chooses the
state rule as an acceptable statement of federal law.""
In answering the question of whether there is authority for federal
law to apply, courts generally look to the constitutional mandate to apply
federal law' 4 and to the policy embodied in the Rules of Decision Act.'
The current line of authority to apply federal law in cases sufficiently
involving a federal function is bottomed primarily on Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States," in which the rights and duties of the United States
on the commercial paper it issues were held to be governed by federal
rather than local law." The Court reasoned that "[w]hen the United
States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitutional
function or power,""' and that "[i]n the absence of an applicable Act

state law be applied as the federal rule. Id. at 1078-79. The motion 133 days after

the delivery of the deed was not considered "untimely as a matter of federal law."
Id. at 1079.
9
See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 410 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law":
Competence and Discretionin the Choice of National and State Rides for Decision,
105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 802, 805 (1957).
10 "The question of judicial incorporation can only arise in an area which is
sufficiently close to a national operation to establish competence in the federal courts
to choose the governing law, and yet not so close as clearly to require the application
of a single nationwide rule of substance." Mishkin, supra note 9, at 805.
"'E.g., United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 715 n.8 (3d Cir. 1964).
"2 E.g., "Since the federal and the state law are the same we need not decide
between them." United States v. Matthews, 244 F.2d 626, 633 (9th Cir. 1957) (concurring opinion).
1" Comment, Rides of Decision in Nondiversity Cases, 69 YALE L.J. 1428,
1442 (1960). See also Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rides
of Decision, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1084, 1099 (1964).
"U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2 (supremacy clause).
1528 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964). "The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of
the United States in cases where they apply."
1 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
'T Id. at 366. The extent of the holding in Clearfield, however, has been drawn
into some doubt. E.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Parnell,
352 U.S. 29 (1956). Nevertheless it has been applied in the field of federally
insured mortgages. See cases cited note 22 infra.
1-8
318 U.S. at 366.
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of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of
law according to their own standards." 19 The principle set down in
Clearfield was amplified by United States v. Allegheny County2 0 to include "every acquisition, holding, or disposition of property by the Federal
Government," 21 and was later refined to hold that the source of the law
governing the relations between the United States and the parties to a
government-insured mortgage to be federal.2 2 Other recent circuit court
decisions have held that "federal law applies in an action by the United
''
States to foreclose a mortgage insured by and assigned to the FHA."
The court in Stadium Apartments answered the first question directly
and found the applicable law to be federal. 24 In so doing it took a position
in accord with the developed law in the area.
After concluding that federal law should apply, the court then turned
to the second question of whether the state law was to be the federal rule.
In answering this question the court first looked to whether Congress or
the federal agency had adopted the state law to further federal policy. The
court concluded that the state redemption statutes had not been adopted
by the Congress 25 or by the FHA 20 and thus faced the question whether it
should adopt judicially the state law as the federal rule. In decisions to
reject the local law as the federal rule, attention frequently has been given
to the intent of Congress and the policies underlying the particular federal
program.2 7 The court, in Stadium Apartments, inferred from Congress'
lack of express adoption of the state law and from the general policies
1
1Id. at 367. One commentator maintains that "[t]he enduring contribution of
Clearfield is its clear establishment of power in the federal courts to select the
governing law in matters related to going operations of the national government."
Mishkin, supra note 9, at 833.
20322 U.S. 174 (1944).
2 I1d. at 182.
"United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir.
1959) ; accord, Clark Inv. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966) ; United
States v. Flower Manor, Inc., 344 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1965) (per curiam) ; United
States v. Chester Park Apts., Inc., 332 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
901 (1964), rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 927 (1965). In the area of Farmers Home
Administration security agreements, the third circuit held that federal law applied,
noting that "[w]hen there is a genuine federal interest, the Constitution or statutes
of the United States can be said to 'require' application of federal law." United
States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 716 n.13 (3d Cir. 1964).
"United States v. Walker Park Realty, Inc., 383 F.2d 732, 733 (2d Cir. 1967)
(per curiam) ; accord, United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968).
" 425 F.2d at 360.
2rId. at 361.
"Id. at 362.
"Friendly, supra note 9, at 410.
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embodied -inthe national housing program a congressional nonintent to
adopt the local law. However, the dissent noted with persuasion that
Congress had consistently refused to enact bills that would have achieved
the same result as this case. 2s
Another major factor considered by federal courts in formulating a
substantive rule rather than adopting the local law is the need for national
uniformity in the administration of the program. 29 This test frequently
is traced to the concern expressed in Clearfield that "application of state
law . . .would subject the rights and duties of the United States to

exceptional uncertainty."8' Fearing such uncertainty among the twentysix states having various post-foreclosure redemption statutes, the court
in Stadium Apartments argued, "[i]t would be contrary to the teaching
of every case we have cited to hold that there is a different federal policy
in each state, thus making FHA 'subject to the vagaries of the laws of the
several states.' , However, the dissent argued that the decision would
render FHA financing less attractive in those states that have redemption statutes and suggested that a lack of uniformity would remain
between those states with overriden redemption provisions and those with
statutes that protect mortgagors and junior lienors in other ways.8 2 Furthermore, the court's position appears weakened by its failure to explain
why uniformity of foreclosure proceedings for the FHA by nonallowance
of redemption rights is desirable for its own sake. When compared with
Clearfield, the federal interest in uniformity in Stadium Apartments does
not appear so great as in the issuance of commercial paper by the government.as
Also pertinent in decisions not to adopt the local law is the protection
of the federal treasury. The coupling of this concern with that for uni28425 F.2d at 372-73.
" Note, Federal Common Law-Married Women's Contracts, 16 BAYIor L.
Rxv. 412, 418 (1964).
8 318 U.S. at 367. This concern for uniformity is reflected in subsequent decisions which declined to adopt the local law as the federal rule. E.g., United
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 377 (1961); United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947); United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596, 597-98 (5th Cir.
1968); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 714-15 (3d Cir. 1964); United
States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1959).
F.2d at 364.
81425
2
Id.at 369. "Some states provide for a statutory appraisal and prohibit fore-

closure for less than a certain percentage of that value, while other states depend on

anti-deficiency legislation and upset prices." Id. at n.1.
" While "a single piece of commercial paper issued by the United States may
easily be involved in several transactions in different states," the Stadium Apartments situation involves "a single transaction within a single state." Id. at 371.
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formity generally is traced to United States v. StandardOil Co.,a4 in which
the government sued to recover hospital expenses incurred for a soldier
who was injured by negligent action of an employee of Standard Oil. The
Court held that the relation between persons in the armed services and the
government derived from federal sources and declined to adopt the state
law 5 that would have denied recovery. 6 In United States v. View Crest
Garden Apartments, Inc.37 the court also invoked the principle of protection of the federal treasury to disregard a state law requiring a sufficient
showing of cause for the appointment of a receiver in the foreclosure of
a mortgage. The court noted that in the government's pursuit of remedies,
factors other than commercial convenience come into play.
Now the federal policy to protect the treasury and to promote the
security of federal investment which in turn promotes the prime purpose of the Act-to facilitate the building of homes by the use of federal credit-becomes predominant. Local rules limiting the effectiveness
of the remedies available to the United States for breach of a federal
duty can not be adopted.3 8
Thus the majority position in Stadium Apartments appears strongest
in its contention that there is substantial precedent to apply federal law
to assure protection of the FHA from loss."9 However, the dissent
saw no reason why the government should not take the risk of redemption
since "[tihe very purpose of the entire federal housing program 'is
40
to provide badly needed housing that could not otherwise exist."
8'332

U.S. 301 (1947).
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 304 n.4.

The question, therefore, is chiefly one of federal fiscal policy, not of special
or peculiar concern to the states or their citizens. And because those matters
ordinarily are appropriate for uniform national treatment rather than diversified local disposition, as well where Congress has not acted affirmatively as
where it has, they are more fittingly determinable by independent federal
judicial decision than by reference to varying state policies.
Id. at 311. However the Court felt that the exercise of judicial power to establish
a new liability of the employer to the United States would intrude into an area
properly in the control of Congress and thus found no liability since Congress had

not acted. Id. at 316.
""268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1959). The court allowed the appointment of a receiver
even though the state standards for appointment had not been met.
"'Id. at 383. Subsequent circuit court decisions have also cited protection of the
federal treasury in declining to adopt the local law. E.g., Clark Inv. Co. v. United
States, 364 F.2d 7, 9 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712,
716 (3d Cir. 1964).
8 425 F.2d at 362.
0Id. at 371.
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In addition, the financial burden imposed on the FHA by the right of
redemption would be no greater than that for any other mortgagee in the
state and would not constitute an absolute or permanent frustration of
the agency's remedy.
Decisions to adopt local law as the federal rule rest upon other factors,
one of which is the traditional role of the states in defining family and
property relationships. 41 In United States v. Yazel 4 2 the Supreme Court
applied the Texas law of coverture to bar a deficiency judgment for the
government on a Small Business Administration loan. The Court asserted
that state interests in the field of family and family-property arrangements
"should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot be served
consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage
if the state law is applied."4 While this might have been taken to
encourage the adoption of the local law in the area of property, the majority
44
in Stadium Apartments distinguished Yazell on its language.
A second factor that must be considered is the local nature of the
activity. In Bumb v. United States4 5 the circuit court declined to cast
aside the requirements of the California Bulk Sales Statute to sustain a
chattel mortgage for the SBA because of the local nature of the transaction." In the Stadium Apartments situation the FHA engrafted part
of the local system of property relations when it defined first mortgage in
terms of the state law. After default it proceeded in a foreclosure action
on a given transaction in a single state. The context of the relationship
thus appears more local than national in its character.
"'Note, 27 U. PiTr. L. Rnv. 712, 714 (1966); e.g., Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272
(1882).
2382 U.S. 341 (1966).

IsId. at 352.
4"The Court in Yazell limited its holding in that "material to the resolution of
the issue presented" [whether to apply the Texas law of coverture to a loan from
the SBA to a husband and wife] was the fact that the loan was "individually
negotiated in painfully particularized detail, and... with specific reference to Texas
law ....

"

Id. at 345-46.

The Stadium Apartments dissent, however, relied on Yazell in framing its test"whether the state law can be given effect without either conflicting with federal
policy or destroying needed uniformity in the pertinent federal law in its operation
within the various states." 425 F.2d at 368 (dissenting opinion).
" 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960).

,16
Id. at 738.

In acquiring security interests, the Small Business Administration is engaging in local activity and in an essentially local transaction. We are unable to conclude that any federal policy in this case requires us to override
the sound and well-established policy of the several states which have a vital
interest in the protection of local property rights and local creditor citizens.
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A final factor is the perceived intent of the Congress. The court in
United States v. Kramel' 7 considered the adoption of state law to be a
"matter of inclusion or exclusion governed by the intent (express or implied) of Congress as suited to the situation in the particular case."'48 As
already observed, the apparent intent of Congress in not adopting measures
to abridge the local right of redemption militates against the abrogation of
the local law in the case of Stadium Apartments.9

While these factors can suggest a tentative answer to the question
whether to adopt state law as the federal rule, they do not exhaust the relevant considerations. Decisions to adopt or not adopt state law have significant impact on the operation of the American federalistic system8 ° and
should be made in the context of the policies that support that system. One
partial solution to the problem of balancing federal interests and state policy
is suggested by noting that from the Rules of Decision Act through Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 1 there is embodied

the tacit assumption that legal rights and obligations do not attach to
a transaction or occurrence unless a competent lawmaking authority
creates them. The act regards the states as the sources of the rights
and obligations which govern day-to-day relations except where the
Constitution, treaties,
or statutes of the United States otherwise re8 2
quire or provide.

If the philosophy of the Rules of Decision Act is applied in answering the
second question of whether to adopt the local law as the federal rule, a
presumption will arise that the state law is adopted." This presumption
could be rebutted by a showing of sufficient federal interest for rejection
of the local law as the federal rule. Since the federal law is interstitial in
nature, building upon the legal relationships established by the states, 5
the state law becomes the primary basis by which men order much of their
everyday affairs. 5 To be able to order their affairs effectively they must
'1234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956). Kramel involved conversion of livestock that
was included in a chattel mortgage held by the Farmers Home Administration.
8Id.at 580. "[I]t would require a very clearly expressed intent so to invade

a field of control [title to real and personal property] which has always been
regarded as peculiarly belonging to the States exclusively." Id. at 582-83.
,0425 F.2d at 372-73 (dissenting opinion).

"Friendly, supra note 9, at 422.
"304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77

L. REV. 1084, 1085 (1964).
"Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1512, 1517 (1969).
"H. HART & H. WEcHSLER, THE F .DERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm

HARV.

435 (1953) (hereinafter cited as
. Id. at 634.

HART

& WECHSLER).
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have some degree of certainty in advance about the rules by which they
are to conduct their daily business."
In Stadium Apartments the court by rejecting the local law of redemption changed a basic premise under which the parties entered into the
mortgage agreement. The parties hardly could have been expected to
anticipate such a decision since the FHA previously had consented to
decrees including provision for redemption rights under the state law.5 7
Arguably all parties to future mortgage agreements are now on notice to
expect different treatment of the right of redemption in an FHA insured
mortgage. However, there remains the burden not only of recognizing
two laws of redemption for mortgages executed in the state but also of
anticipating in what other areas of mortgage law the previously accepted
state law may be cast aside in favor of formulating a federal rule.
Thus the import of this decision is to diminish the certainty of the
primary law that constitutes the basic framework of daily life."8 The
implications of this erosion of certainty have been viewed with concern
by scholars such as Henry Hart, who observed that "[p] eople repeatedly
subjected, like Pavlov's dogs, to two or more inconsistent sets of directions, without means of resolving the inconsistencies, could not fail in the
end to react as the dogs did. The society, collectively, would suffer a
nervous breakdown." 5 9 While the decision in Stadium Apartments will
not in itself precipitate a national nervous breakdown, the extent to which
it contradicts the expectation of a party involved renders the law less
certain and less able to serve as a guide to conduct. 0
A final consideration is the impact that decisions not to adopt the state
law and to formulate a federal rule may have on the already overloaded
docket of the federal courts, and consequently on the courts' efficiency and
clarity of decision. Each decision to reject state law and to formulate a
federal rule brings another issue into the federal courts, which may require
further explanation by the lower courts or consideration by the Supreme
Court if the desired uniformity of federal rule is to be achieved among
all the circuit courts. Yet Judge Friendly has noted that the nation's
judicial business has grown "far beyond the capacity of any single court
"' Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54

COLUm.

L. Zrv. 489

(1954). See also HART & WECHSLER 634.
United States v. Stadium Apts., Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir. 1970).

• Hart, supra note 56, at 491.
Id. at 489.
Comment, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Cases, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1445
(1960).
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to preserve uniformity by the force of example."" Thus a decision to
reject the state law as the federal rule induces confusion regarding the
primary rules of conduct in two ways: first, by posing two laws on the
same subject and raising doubts about the viability of other state rules;
and second, by injecting imprecision through hurried opinions and conflicting decisions among the circuits.
When, as in Stadium Apartments, a court chooses to reject the
state law as the federal rule, it should face squarely the impact of that
decision on the certainty and clarity of its guides to future conduct,
especially in an area such as the law of property where the state law is
widely presumed to apply and in fact is applied to govern the relations of
the parties. The local rule should be rejected only when a sufficient federal
interest warrants intrusion into the traditional ambit of the local guides to
conduct and the resulting confusion for those who rely on them to plan
their future transactions is justified. In Stadium Apartments the consequences to the federal system were not confronted directly nor was
there an adequate showing of the requisite federal interest to warrant
the result obtained.
KENNETH C. DAY
Federal Jurisdiction-Derivative Jurisdiction Upon Removal
"[P] rompt, economical, and sound administration of justice depends
upon definite and finally accepted principles governing important areas of
litigation, such as the respective jurisdictions of federal and state
courts ....,1 One such principle is derivative jurisdiction in the removal
area; title 28, United States Code, section 14412 allows removal at de" Friendly, supra note 9, at 405. See also Mishkin, The Federal"Question" in
the District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. R-v. 157, 158 (1953).

2American Fire and Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6,8 (1951). Defendant, who had
removed on grounds of diversity, lost on the merits in federal court. On appeal he

asked that the case be remanded because of jurisdictional shortcomings, and the
Court in an opinion written by Justice Reed granted his request, feeling that the
ends of justice would be better served through strict enforcement of jurisdictional
requirements.
. The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) concerns actions removable generally:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil

action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United

States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant .. to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the

place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
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fendant's urging of any case from state court into federal court, provided
that the federal court had original jurisdiction. 3 However, the federal
court also inquires into the jurisdiction of the court from which the case
is removed. When jurisdiction is concurrent, Congress may have designated certain types of state courts as the only appropriate state forums,
and thus the federal court's inquiry will focus on this conformity.4 When
jurisdiction is exclusively federal, the court must look to the subject
matter of the action to determine whether it is within the realm of the
exclusive jurisdiction, in which event no state court would be a proper
forum. In any case, the jurisdiction of the federal court upon removal is
derivative in nature.'
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion,
may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
' Jurisdiction normally breaks down into two areas, jurisdiction over person
and jurisdiction over subject matter. Of the two, jurisdiction over subject matter
is the more important and is the topic of the text. Jurisdiction over person may be
waived either explicitly or implicitly by the parties, but jurisdiction over subject
matter cannot be. The federal courts strive not to let technical imperfections in
service of process interfere with hearing the case on the merits. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(h). On the other hand a federal court will take cognizance of a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion and will dismiss the case. Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
'E.g., Beckman v. Graves, 360 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1966). A farmer commenced
action in a Kansas county court to review the wheat marketing quota imposed on
him by his local committee pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
Defendant agricultural agent removed to federal district court where the action was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Such action would have been properly brought
if filed in any state court having general jurisdiction, but in Kansas the state
district courts are courts of general jurisdiction while the county courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction. Since the action was instituted in the improper state court,
the circuit court affirmed the dismissal.
'Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377 (1922); accord,
Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943). The theory of derivative jurisdiction is not limited solely to the federal removal area. It has been applied in state
systems of justice, which rely on a dual judiciary. For instance, formerly in
North Carolina, justice of the peace courts had concurrent jurisdiction with
superior court on claims of less than $200. Appeal from the justice's court was to
the superior court and invoked a trial de novo. Even though the superior court
had original jurisdiction, the appeal would be dismissed if the justice of the peace
court had no jurisdiction since jurisdiction was entirely derivative. Hopkins v.
Barnhardt, 223 N.C. 617, 27 S.E.2d 732 (1943). The recent reorganization of the
courts, resulting in a unitary system, should eradicate the doctrine in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-4 (1969).
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Leesona Corp. v. Concordia Manufacturing Co.' is a recent federal
district court case illustrative of this doctrine. Leesona owned patents
which it licensed to certain manufacturers. One of the licensees, KayserRoth Corporation, became concerned about the validity of the patents and
defaulted on a royalty payment. Prior experience had revealed to Leesona
that when one licensee defaulted on payments the remaining licensees discontinued payments also, pending settlement of the initial dispute. Accordingly Leesona waged simultaneous suits in the Rhode Island courts
with Kayser-Roth to recover damages for contract violation, and with some
sixty other licensees to determine the rights of the parties in order to
prevent default on payments. Leesona took a voluntary dismissal as to
the contracts action and then added Kayser-Roth as a defendant to the
second suit for construction of the contracts and declaration as to the
validity of the patents. The defendants removed to federal district court
in Rhode Island, and there offered five grounds for dismissal, one of
which was lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants argued
that since suits concerning patent validity are to be tried exclusively in
the federal courts,7 the state court did not have original jurisdiction over
the suit; thus the federal court acquired none on removal. The court ruled
that indeed this was a suit designed primarily to test patent validity, not
one merely construing licensing agreements, and granted the motions to
dismiss.'
Leesona sharply outlines the paradox inherent in the derivative jurisdiction doctrine. When jurisdiction over a particular suit is exclusively
vested in the federal courts,9 and the suit is filed in a state court and then
removed, the federal court will not entertain the cause of action for lack
of jurisdiction. Since dismissal is without prejudice, the plaintiff may
return the next day and file his suit in the court that had previously dis0
The aim of this note is to explore the origin and development
missed it.Y
of the doctrine and to assess the utility of its application in this context.
The earliest indication of the doctrine's existence appears in a rarely
312 F. Supp. 392 (D.R.I. 1970).
128 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964).
8312 F. Supp. at 397.
' Some of the areas of exclusive jurisdiction are the following: admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; bankruptcy proceedings; copyright cases; and special areas
such as litigation of ICC orders, federal antitrust actions, and federal tort claims.
See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (2d ed. 1970).
" For possible statute of limitations problems which plaintiff might encounter
see pp. 372-73 and notes 26-29 infra.
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cited dictum of Martin v. Hunters Lessee11 stating that the power of
removal is not strictly an exercise of original jurisdiction, but presupposes
that original jurisdiction has attached in the state court.12 Aside from this
rather dubious beginning there are two other recognizable sources of the
doctrine. One is in a technical reading of the removal statute-more spe'
cifically the interpretation of the word "suit,"18
which appeared in place of
4
the term "civil action" in earlier versions of the statute. Simply put, a
controversy is not a suit unless it is instituted in a court of competent
jurisdiciton. Hence a controversy being litigated in a state court having
improper jurisdiction never attains the status of a suit-a status necessary
if the requirements of the removal statute are to be met.15 Another source
frames itself in this obvious tautology: Any defense available in the state
court is available in the federal court after removal; the rights of the
parties are not changed by removal.' 6 In logical pursuit of this concept,
any claim of improper jurisdiction of the state court may be revived after
removal.
The Supreme Court in two 1922 opinions carefully defined the derivative jurisdiction of the federal courts upon removalY Preceding
1 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
12
This power of removal is not to be found in express terms in any part of
the constitution; if it be given, it is only given by implication, as a power
necessary and proper to carry into effect some express power. The power of
removal is certainly not, in strictness of language [an exercise of original
jurisdiction]; it presupposes an exercise of original jurisdiction to have
attached elsewhere.
Id. at 349 (the bracketed portion does not appear in the United States Reports but
does appear in 4 L. Ed. 97, 108 (1816)).
"E.g., the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 553:
any suit of a civil nature ... of which the circuit courts of the United States
are given original jurisdiction, which now may be pending, or which may
hereafter be brought, in any State court, may be removed by the defendant
to the circuit court of the United States for the proper district. (emphasis added)
1128 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), the text of which appears in note 2 supra.
"Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467 (1890); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gill
Car10Co.,
25 F.Davis
737 (C.C.S.D.
Compare
v. Gray, 83Ohio
U.S.1885).
(16 Wall.) 203 (1872) with Wabash W. Ry.
v. Brow, 164 U.S. 271 (1896) and Cain v. Commercial Publishing Co., 232 U.S.
124 (1914). Possibly the earliest indication of availability of all state defenses was
in Gier v. Gregg, 10 F. Cas. 339 (No. 5406) (C.C.D. I1. 1847): "The case, when
removed from the state court to the circuit court of the United States, stands in
the latter court as it stood in the former, before the removal." Id.
17 The doctrine was already established in the lower courts. R.J. Darnell, Inc.
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 190 F. 656 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1911). See Sheldon v. Wabash
R.R., 105 F. 785 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1900); Auracher v. Omaha & St. L.R.R., 102 F. 1
(C.C.S.D. Iowa 1900); Swift v. Philadelphia & R.R.R., 58 F. 858 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1893).
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decisions had indicated the way,.8 but Lambert Run Coat Co. v. Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad9 and GeneralInvestment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern Railway"0 firmly established the doctrine. In Lambert the
plaintiff coal company filed suit in the state court to enjoin the railroad
from following certain rules of railroad car distribution prescribed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The defendant removed to federal
district court which granted the injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed
the circuit court's reversal of this decision and noted that the suit should
have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, since review of ICC orders
is to occur exclusively in the federal courts. 2 ' The plaintiff in General
Investment sought to enjoin the merger of defendant railroads on the
grounds that such merger violated the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust
Acts. The defendants removed from the state court into federal district
court and asked for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
ruled that the suit was properly dismissed. 2 Again Congress had provided
exclusive jurisdiction for federal courts over private suits filed under these
antitrust acts.m
In both Lambert and GeneralInvestment the federal court could have
properly entertained the actions if they had originally been brought
there. Since they had arrived via removal they were treated to the peculiar
twist exerted by the derivative jurisdiction doctrine--dismissal. The stance
of the Supreme Court has remained unchanged on this problem, 24 and the
unswerving dedication of the lower federal courts 5 to the precedent established in Lambert and General Investment indicates their reluctance to
depart judicially from the doctrine,
The primary justification for retention of the doctrine in its strictest
application is that it is a definite and accepted principle helping to define
the important area of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus it gives incentive
8American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916);
DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
*258 U.S. 377 (1922).
20260 U.S. 261 (1922).
21 Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 219, currently embodied in 28 U.S.C.
§2321 (1964).
2 260 U.S. at 288: "When a cause is removed from a state court into a federal
court the latter takes it as it stood in the former. A want of jurisdiction in the state
court is not cured by the removal, but may be asserted after it is consummated."
"See Clayton Act, Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731, currently
embodied in 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
"See Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943) ; Minnesota v. United
States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
"Martinez v. Seaton, 285 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1961); Keay v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1967).
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to plaintiffs' lawyers to file their complaints in the proper forum initially.
Yet in the early stages of a suit the issues may not be in sharp focus, and
it is often difficult for the lawyer to select the proper court. In Leesona
the plaintiff wanted its large number of licensees to continue to abide by
the contracts, which in turn depended on the validity of the patents. In
order to file suit in the proper forum, Leesona's lawyer had to decide
whether the action sounded in contract or in patent law. Since he was mistaken in his choice, the case was dismissed despite its subsequent removal
into the correct forum. There are harsher blows than dismissal without
prejudice, but such a ruling is nonetheless costly to the plaintiff whose
lawyer has expended considerable time and effort in futile argument.
If the plaintiff wishes to reinstitute proceedings in federal court, he
immediately encounters a possible statute of limitations problem. Although
28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1964) provides that after removal the state court
"shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded" and thus
presumably 6 tolls any statute of limitations where the state courts are
concerned, 7 it does not follow that this has effect where jurisdiction is
exclusively federal. In this case the federal cause of action is governed by
a federal statute of limitations, either specified by Congress or incorporated
into federal law from state law as a matter of policy.28 Since a dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction would seemingly designate all proceedings thus far a nullity, then the appropriate statute of limitations
would not have been tolled," and if the time limit has run before the
" This presumption arises because plaintiff is prevented from renewing his
efforts in the state court, notwithstanding that he intends to proceed in a correct
manner, until the federal court remands or dismisses. Thus, in State Hwy & Pub.
Works Comm'n v. Diamond S.S. Transp. Corp., 226 N.C. 371, 378-79, 38 S.E.2d
214, 219 (1946), where plaintiff was enjoined by federal court from proceeding
except in that jurisdiction and later had his suit dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, he was not barred by the statute of limitations from now proceeding in
state court. A federal statute enjoining proceedings in the state court would seem
to have equal if not greater weight than a court order.
' Thus in the fact situation of Beckman v. Graves, 360 F.2d 148 (10th Cir.
1966), plaintiff could return to a state court of general jurisdiction in Kansas,
confident that in the interval between removal and eventual dismissal in federal
court the statute was tolled.
"See 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3.07[2] (1970).
" Black v. City Nat'l Bank &Trust Co., 321 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Mo.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 920 (1959). This would not necessarily be true if the appropriate statute
of limitations has a "saving" clause whcih extends the time period in the event that

plaintiff's complaint is dismissed or nonsuited before receiving a hearing on the
merits. Factor v. Carson, Pirie Scott & Co., 393 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1968); Lowry
v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 220 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1955); Johnson v.
United States, 68 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1934). A recent decision has held a statute of
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plaintiff refiles, his cause of action could very easily have been cut off
by the statute.
Assuming that the statute of limitations has not run, then a new complaint must be drawn and filed with the accompanying lost office time and
recurring annoyances such as filing fees" ° and service of process. In
Leesona, though an extreme example, there were some sixty defendants
who would have to be reached through methods of process available in
Rhode Island, entailing several hundred dollars in cost. The defendants,
while victorious in the tactical maneuvering, have won only a Pyrrhic
victory if the statute has not run and the plaintiff refiles since they face
corresponding expenses.
After refiling, the suit most likely will be placed towards the rear of
the court calendar. This delay when coupled with the loss of time caused
by removal, the dismissal arguments, and any wait plaintiff might have
taken before refiling means that a substantial period of time will have
passed before the merits of the controversy are reached. As a consequence,
evidence may be lost and witnesses may leave the jurisdiction or even die.
Furthermore it is axiomatic that an extended lapse of time decreases the
trustworthiness of oral testimony. The real danger is that the case will
become so stale that the true merits are never discovered adding credence
to Gladstone's maxim that "justice delayed is justice denied."3 1
The federal court system also has an interest in the refiling of a suit
after dismissal; the courts are over-burdened with litigation, and court
time is at a premium. A significant contribution to efficiency in the federal
district courts was made by the implementation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Promulgated by the Supreme Court, the rules are to be
construed "to secure the just, speedy, arid inexpensive determination of
every action."3 2 In view of this objective a contradiction bordering on the
absurd exists in a federal system of justice which so rigidly adheres to
the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction. For a plaintiff who pursues his
claim, the likelihood is that the final determination will have been anything
but just, speedy, and inexpensive.
Conflict has occurred at least once between the policies underlying the
limitations tolled where federal court had jurisdiction but dismissed on grounds of

v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
Burnett
improper venue. fee
for civil actions in the federal district courts in North Carolina
" The filing
is fifteen dollars.
11 As quoted in France, Judicial Reorganizaton-A Solution to Congestion, 68
DIcK. L. REv. 143 (1964).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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new rules and those behind derivative jurisdiction. In Freeman v. Bee
Machine Co.- the defendant removed a breach of contract action into
federal district court. The plaintiff promptly moved to amend in order to
add a Clayton Act claim for treble damages over which the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction. Based on the theory of derivative jurisdiction,
district courts had not previously allowed such joinder, 4 and the plaintiff's motion was accordingly denied. The circuit court reversed, and the
Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that Congress had provided that
a properly removed suit should be treated as though it had been originally
commenced in district court. 5 Thus the federal rules controlled, notwithstanding that such amendment would not have been allowed in the
state court." This approach is an effective circumvention of the principle
of derivative jurisdiction in the interests of judicial economy-the policy
underpinning the liberal joinder of claims.
Freeman marks the limits of progress made by the courts in undercutting the derivative jurisdiction doctrine. In view of this judicial reluctance, the American Law Institute has proposed the abolition of the
doctrine through act of Congress. 7 Under the ALI provisions, a suit
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, mistakenly commenced in the state courts, will not be dismissed upon removal for want
of jurisdiction but will be retained as having been properly removed. 8
Presumably, under these proposals speculation on the impact of a federal
statute of limitations would become moot since the plaintiff is spared
the unnecessary act of refiling.
In a dual judicial system, uncertainty in the area of original and concurrent jurisdiction will persist. Yet when the plaintiff in good faith
selects a state court and the defendant removes, for the federal court to
dismiss on the ground that it is the court of original jurisdiction is to exalt
form over substance. Among commentators who have addressed themselves to the problem, Professors Moore 9 and Wright" have expressed
distaste for this peculiar application of the doctrine. A correction certainly
S319 U.S. 448 (1943).
,Carroll v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 405, 408 (S.D.N.Y.
1937).
" Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 38, 36 Stat. 1098.
319 U.S. at 452.
2

, ALI STUDY OF THE DIVIsION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CouRTs §§ 1312(d), 1317(b), & 1382(e) (1969).
8 Id. Commentary to § 1312(d), at 206-207.
'

1A J. MOORE,

WRIGHT, note

FEDERAL PRAcTIcE

8 supra, at § 38.

0.157(3), at 86 (1965).
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is in order, whether it be through judicial reconstruction of the removal
statute with an eye toward policy considerations prominent in this day, or
through act of Congress.
JOHN WOODWARD DE-Es

Income Taxation-Nondeductibility of Appraisal Litigation Expenses
In two recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that litigation expenses incurred by either individual stockholders1 or a
corporation 2 in a statutory appraisal proceeding to value shares of dissenting shareholders were not deductible as nonbusiness 3 or business4 expenses. The holdings in Woodward v. Commissioner5 and United States
v. Hilton Hotels Corp.6 resolved conflicting results reached earlier by the
eighth 7 and seventh' circuits in essentially similar fact situations. The disallowance of the claimed deductions in these cases may have significant
impact upon future corporate decisions regarding proposed alterations of
their corporate structures when there is a substantial likelihood of appraisal proceedings being instituted. Moreover, the character of the
appraisal remedy itself as a protective device for the interests of dissenting
shareholders may be affected by the decisions.
In Woodward, taxpayers owning a majority of stock in a publishing
firm voted to extend the corporation's finite charter. The minority stockholder voted against the extension and, pursuant to Iowa law,9 majority
taxpayers negotiated to purchase the minority's stock interest. Following
1 Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
2United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
3INT. IEV. CODE of 1954, § 212 [hereinafter cited as § 212] provides in general:

In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses ... (1) for the production or collection of
income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income; or (3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) [hereinafter cited as § 162] permits the
'IT.
deduction of all ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses.
397 U.S. 572 (1970).
0397 U.S. 580 (1970).
Woodward v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1969).
' Hilton Hotels Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969).
' IowA CODE ANN. §491.25 (1949), provides that the majority shareholders
voting for renewal "shall have three years from the date such action for renewal
was taken in which to purchase and pay for the stock voting against such renewal."
Although the Iowa statute would characterize the action taken by the majority
stockholders as a "renewal," in essence the action involved the creation of a perpetual corporation from a fitite one.
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unsuccessful efforts to value the stock, taxpayers initiated appraisal proceedings in state court. Eventually the stock was purchased by the majority
at a price determined in the appraisal proceeding. 10
When taxpayers sought to deduct over twenty-five thousand dollars
paid to attorneys, accountants, and appraisers, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue characterized the amounts as capital expenditures that were
"incurred in connection with the acquisition of capital stock of a corporation" 11 and disallowed the claimed deductions. The ruling was affirmed
by the Tax Court 12 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.'"
In Hilton the taxpayer corporation, owning approximately ninety per
cent of the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, voted to merge the corporations. 4
Prior to the vote, a minority of Waldorf shareholders filed their objections to the merger and demanded payment for their shares in accordance
with New York Stock Corporation Law.' 5 Hilton consummated the
merger and made a cash offer to the dissenters. The offer was rejected
by the dissenters who then began appraisal proceedings in state court, as
provided for by section 91 of the New York Stock Corporation Law.' 0
7
A settlement was agreed to by the parties and approved by the court.'
Hilton sought to deduct consulting fees, legal expenses, and expenditures for other professional services in connection with the appraisal proceeding. As in Woodward, the Commissioner disallowed the deductions,
asserting that they were capital expenditures."3 Following payment of the
tax and filing of suit for refund by Hilton, the district court ruled that the
10 397

U.S. at 573.

11 Id.

" Fred Woodward, 49 T.C. 377 (1968).
Woodward v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1969).

1

1L397

U.S. at 582.

Section 91 enabled a stockholder who voted against consolidation to demand
an appraisal to determine the fair market value of his shares and to have the shares
paid for pursuant to section 21. Ch. 359, § 7 [1937] N.Y. Sess. L. 936, now embodied in N.Y. Bus. Coup. LAW § 623(c) (McKinney 1963). Section 21 of the
New York Stock Corporation Law provided:
(6) Any stockholder demanding payment for his shares shall have no right
to receive any dividends or distributions payable to holders of such stock of
record after the close of business on the day next preceding the date of the
stockholders' vote in favor of the action to which such objection was made,
and upon such vote shall cease to have any other rights of a shareholder of
the corporation in respect to such stock, except the right to receive payment
for the value thereof.
Ch. 647, § 6 [1950] N.Y. Sess. L. 1504, now embodied in N.Y. Bus. Corp. LAW
623(e) (McKinney 1963).
Ch. 359, § 7 [1937] N.Y. Sess. L. 936.
15

1? 397

18Id.

U.S. at 582.
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appraisal litigation expenses were deductible. 9 Its decision was affirmed
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals."0
Four factual differences can be discerned in the two cases. First, the
type of underlying transaction in Woodward was an extension of a finite
charter to a perpetual one; Hilton involved a statutory merger. Second,
the laws of the two situs states differed with regard to the time when title
to the dissenters' stock is deemed to have passed. Under Iowa law, title
of the stock did not pass until after the price had been determined by
the parties or in the appraisal proceeding. 2 New York law, however, provides that title passes as soon as the minority registers its dissent, at which
point the dissenters become creditors of the acquiring company for the
fair value of their stock. 22 Third, in Woodward the individual majority
stockholders were required to purchase the dissenter's interest," whereas
in Hilton the corporation acquired the minority's shares.24 Finally, deductions in the two cases were sought under different sections of the
Internal Revenue Code. Individual taxpayers in Woodward sought to
deduct appraisal expenses as nontrade or nonbusiness expenses under
section 212. The Hilton corporation claimed deduction of its appraisal
litigation expenses as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162.
Upon review, the Supreme Court disallowed the claimed deductions in
both cases. The principal holding was delivered in Woodward in which
Mr. Justice Marshall began by noting that capital expenditures were not
deductible under either section 212 or section 162,25 sections of the Internal
2
Revenue Code that had been judicially declared to be in pari materia.

" Hilton Hotels v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
20 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969).
21
See note 9 mipra.
* See note 15 supra; see also 397 U.S. at 583.
'IowA CODE ANx. § 491.25 (1949).
O" See note 16 supra.
21397 U.S. at 574; INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 263 (a) [hereinafter cited as
§ 263], provides generally that no deduction will be allowed for capital expenditures.
TREAs. REG. § 1.263(a)-(b) (1958), defines capital expenditures as "amounts paid
or incurred (1) to add to the value, or substantially prolong the useful life, of property owned by the taxpayer, such as plant or equipment, or (2) to adapt property
to a new or different use."
2 397 U.S. at 575, n.3; cf. Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 373 (1944).
The significance of this statement is that the fact of deduction being sought in one
case under section 162 and in the other under section 212 is of no consequence since
Congress provided the nonbusiness deduction in 1941 to afford individual taxpayers
the same opportunities to deduct certain expenses from gross income that had been
available to corporate taxpayers. Id. at 373-74, citing H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th
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He then proceeded to state that any costs incurred in the acquisition or
disposition of a capital asset were capital in nature, including such ancillary expenses as legal and accounting fees 2 7 Mr. Justice Marshall rejected the "primary purpose" test as a standard for determining whether
the costs were to be considered as "incurred in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset.1 28 This test had been adopted by the seventh
circuit in Hilto 29 and two lower courts in other cases involving deductions for appraisal litigation expenses." Instead of asking whether the
Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 74-76 (1944); S.REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88
(1944).
" 397 U.S. at 575-76; see also Spangler

v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.
1963) (taxpayer's litigation expenses in recovering property sold upon fraudulent

inducement held to be capital expenditures); United States v. St. Joe Paper Co.,
284 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1960) (taxpayer's legal expenses following acquisition of
stock in company about to reorganize held to be part of stock's cost and capital in
nature). See generally 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION

§§ 25.25, 25.26, 25A0, 25A.15 [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
28 397 U.S. at 577. The "primary purpose" test was first developed with reference
to TREAs. REG. § 1.263(a)-2(c) (1958), which requires expenditures incurred in
"defending or perfecting title to property" to be capitalized. Strictly construed, this
regulation would require the capitalization of any litigation expenses since title
may be conceivably affected in virtually any suit against a taxpayer. Convinced
that Congress did not intend such a fate for all legal expenses, the courts determined
that such expenses be capitalized under the regulation only when the taxpayer's
"primary purpose" in the litigation was to defend or perfect title to property.
See Rassenfoss v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1946).
20410 F.2d at 196.
"Vermont Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 682 (D. Vt.
1969); Smith Hotel Enterprises, Inc. v. Nelson, 236 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
But see Boulder Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. Okla. 1954).
If the "primary purpose" test were applied to Woodward and Hilton, the expenditures would probably be deductible. The "primary purpose" tests asks simply what
chiefly motivated or prompted the taxpayer to incur the expenditure in question.
If the expenditure was not incurred in order to effect the acquisition of a capital
asset, the expenses would be deductible. Here both underlying transactions had
been completed prior to the initiation of appraisal proceedings. Taxpayers arguably
incurred the appraisal litigation expenses and acquired the dissenters' shares only
because of statutory requirements. Indeed, the appraisal proceedings could have
been avoided if dissenters and the taxpayers in each case had been successful in
negotiating the value of the former's shares. Thus, it could not be argued that
the appraisal proceedings were necessary to complete either the renewal in Woodward or the merger in Hilton. The appraisal remedy aims at the establishment
of a fair value for dissenters' shares. See note 56 infra. Accordingly, taxpayers in
Woodward and Hiltonr should be able to argue successfully that the "primary purpose! of incurring the appraisal expenses was not to complete a capital transaction or
to acquire a capital asset, but only to establish the "fair value" of dissenters' stock,
which under Iowa and New York law the majorities and acquiring corporation were
required respectively to purchase. The expenditures would then be deductible. See,
Comment, Deductibility of Appraisal Litigation Expenses, 70 COLUm. L. REV.
538, 548-50 (1970).
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primary purpose of the expenditure was to acquire a capital asset, the
Court held that the proper inquiry looked to the "origin and character
of the claim.""1 If the expenses in question originated in the process of
acquiring or disposing of a capital asset, the expenses must be capitalized.
The Court reasoned that since the establishment of the purchase price,
herein accomplished by the appraisal court, was clearly part of the process
of acquisition, it followed that the appraisal litigation expenses were part
of the stock's cost and had to be capitalized.3
The Court in Hilton primarily relied upon Woodward to rule that
the appraisal expenses were nondeductible. The taxpayer had argued that
the expenses could not be regarded as part of the process of acquisition
since, under New York law, unlike the Iowa law governing the parties in
Woodward, title had already passed to the acquired corporation before
appraisal proceedings commenced. The Court in Hilton rejected this
argument, saying that the "functional nature of the appraisal remedy as
a forced purchase of the dissenters' stock is the same, whether title
passes before or after the price is determined.""
The Supreme Court's disallowance of appraisal litigation cost deduction
in Woodward and Hilton regrettably leaves many questions unanswered.
The Court correctly noted in Woodward that expenses incurred in connection with the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset had to be
capitalized.3 4 What the Court was really called upon to decide is how
sufficiently related to a capital acquisition or disposition an expense
must be before it is deemed to be incurred in connection with the acquisition or disposition and is therefore required to be capitalized. Will deduction problems of this nature be resolved by determining if the expenditure
in question was incurred in order to effect the acquisition or disposition of
a capital asset, i.e., if such an objective was the taxpayer's "primary purpose?"'35 Or will a more indirect causal relationship between the expense
and capital acquisition or disposition require the capitalization of the
former? The Court in Woodward adopted the latter approach.
As previously stated, the Court concluded in Woodward that an
"origin and character" test should be used to determine the deductibility
' 397 U.S. at 578. The Court relied on United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39
(1963).
32 397 U.S. at 579.
8IId.
,Id. at 575.
"See note 28 supra.
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tion of a capital asset. 8 Such a test looks to the "origin and character"
of the expenditure, rather to its "primary purpose." Rejecting the "primary purpose" test as too uncertain for such tax problems, the Court preferred the "simpler inquiry whether the origin of the claim litigated is in
the process of acquisiton itself."' 37 The Court relied upon United States
v. Gilmore,8 in which expenses of defending a divorce suit were disallowed because the claim stemmed from the marital relationship and not
from the conservation of income-producing assets.39
The genesis of the "origin and character" type of analysis for tax
problems may be found in Lykes v. United States,40 in which a taxpayer
was not allowed to deduct litigation expenses incurred in contesting the
amount of his federal gift tax under section 212 because the expense was
attributable to the gifts and not to the conservation of his incomeproducing assets.4 1 The Court in Lykes reasoned that since the litigation
expenses would not have arisen but for the gift and those expenses could
be traced to the gift for their origin, the expenses were of a personal
nature and could not be deducted.' Applying the type of causal analysis
employed in Lykes to Woodward and Hilton, the appraisal litigation
expenses would be regarded as originating in the process of acquiring the
dissenters' shares, and since such acquisition is of a capital character, the
expenses would not be deductible.

43

The problem with an "origin and character" type of analysis was
suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent in Lykes:
A majority of my brethren think they can escape this conclusion by
going further back in the chain of causation. They can say the cause
of this legal expense was the gift. Of course one can reason, as my
brethren do, that if there had been no gift there would have been no
tax, if there had been no tax, there would have been no deficiency, if
there were no deficiency there would have been no contest, if there were
no contest there would have been no expense. And so the gifts caused
" 397 U.S. at 577.
3' Id.

88 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
"Id. at 51.

,343 U.S. 118 (1952).
,Id. at 125.

"The specific holding of Lykes was overruled by Congress through an amend-

ment of section 212 in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, but the causal analysis
employed by the majority in that decision has survived. Snyder, The Impact of
Supreme Court Decisions of the Deduction of Legal Fees, 23 TAx LAW. 339, 342
(1970).
"See 397 U.S. at 577.

1971]

APPRAISAL LITIGATION EXPENSES

the expense. The fallacy of such logic is that it would be just as possible
to employ it to prove that the lawyer's fees were caused by having
children. If there had been no children, there would have been no
gift .... If this reasoning were presented by a taxpayer, what would
we say of it? 4
Accordingly, it can be seen that the "origin and character" test of necessity
involves a highly subjective causal exploration in tax situations where the
issue is whether litigation expenses arose from personal activities of the
taxpayer. Prior to Woodward and Hilton, this test had not been extended
to cover tax problems involving expenses allegedly incurred in the process
of acquiring or disposing of a capital asset.
It would appear that the same problems of unpredictable causal explorations and likelihood of inconsistent results that were pointed to by Mr.
Justice Jackson in Lykes will likely surround the extended application
of the "origin and character" test to tax questions similar to those presented in Woodward and Hilton. For example, it is well-established that
expenses of a complete liquidation, including legal and accounting fees,
are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. 45 But suppose that the Lykes-Gilmore type of analysis (now that of Woodward and
Hilton) is applied to determine the deductibility of liquidation expenses.
If the origin of the corporation's decision to liquidate can be traced to
a personal dispute between two principal shareholders or to some other
personal reason, the "origin and character" test would disallow deduction
of hitherto unquestionably deductible expenses. Courts have permitted
the deduction of liquidation expenses on the theory that no capital asset
was being created or continued,46 although liquidation does involve a disposition of capital assets. But if the "origin and character" type of
analysis is valid for tax questions such as those raised in Lykes-Gilmore
and now Woodward-Hilton,there is no reason not to apply it to liquidation
and other tax problems. Such application would require tax courts to
make a subjective search for the origin of any transaction giving rise to
expenses of questionable deductibility. It would appear then that the
Court's adoption of the "origin and character" test for the problems posed
in Woodward and Hilton portends increasing uncertainty for the taxpayer
and increasing tax litigation for the courts. The Court in Woodward
"343 U.S. at 128.
" Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965); Gravois
Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962).
" Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199, 206 (8th Cir.
1962), citing 4 MERTENS § 25.35.
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fails to justify its rejection of the alternative "primary purpose" test. The
Court's approach is especially questionable in view of the fact that there
have been a number of cases involving expenditures connected with the
acquisition or disposition of a capital asset that have been resolved by
analysis that focuses on the purpose of the expenditure rather than its
"origin and character. ' 47
Another question emerging in the wake of the decisions concerns the
possibility of an argument by the taxpayer in the Woodward fact situation
that the appraisal litigation expenses are deductible as organizational
expenditures under section 248 of the Internal Revenue Code. 48 Applying
the "origin and character" test adopted by the Court, the expenses of the
appraisal proceeding could be said to lie in the extension of the corporate
charter by the majority shareholders. Since that transaction essentially
resulted in the creation of a perpetual corporation from a finite one, the
ensuing appraisal expenses should arguably be deductible as organizational
expenses under section 248."9
,'See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 275, 305 (Ct. Cl.
1965); Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962);
see especially Campbell v. Fields, 229 F.2d 197, 203 (5th Cir. 1956), in which the
taxpayer incurring litigation and surveying charges incident to the establishment

of unitization, pooling, and operating agreements between himself and other gas
and oil lessees, was allowed to deduct such expenses because they had not been for
the purpose of acquiring a capital asset but to satisfy a requirement of a state
regulatory commission. This case would appear to support an argument that if the
"primary purpose" test were applied to the facts in Woodward and Hilton, the
appraisal expenses would be deductible, in view of the fact that the proceeding was
required by state law. See, Comment, Deductibility of Appraisal Litigation Expenes, 70 COLUm. L. R!v. 538, 550 (1970). See also Straub v. Granger, 143 F.

Supp. 250 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (legal expenses paid for advice given on ways to
preserve taxpayer's interest in a closely held corporation held deductible, even
though a majority of the corporation's stock was acquired pursuant to such
advice). The district court in Straub noted that the legal expenses were "regarded
properly in relation to the purpose for which taxpayers obtained counsel rather
than to the increased ownership which resulted." Id. at 254. "Primary purpose"
was held to be the governing test there and "the fact that the taxpayers' ownership
in the corporation was increased partly through the services of counsel does not
establish that counsel was paid for acquiring stock." Id. at 255.
"' INT. Rnv. CoDn of 1954, §248(a) provides that organizational expenditures
of a corporation may be treated as deferred expenses and deducted ratably from
gross income. Section 248(b) defines an organizational expenditure as one which
"(1) is incident to the creation of the corporation (2) is chargeable to capital
account; and (3) is of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of
a corporation having a limited life, would be amortizable over such life." TREAS.
REG. § 248-1(b) (2) (1956), adds that "legal services incident to the organization
of the corporation" are organizational expenditures.
" Such an argument would not be available to the taxpayer in Hilton since the
49
original transaction was a reorganization which clearly requires capital treatment.
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Unfortunately the opinions in Woodward and Hilton do not discuss
the tax consequences of the holdings for the corporate taxpayer. The
Court in Woodward does note that capital expenditures "are added to
the basis of the capital asset with respect to which they are incurred,
and are taken into account for tax purposes either through depreciation or
by reducing the capital gain (or increasing the loss) when the asset is
sold." 150 For the taxpayer in the Hilton situation, it would appear that the
appraisal expenses may never be taken into account for tax purposes. Any
stock is nondepreciable, for it is an intangible asset with an unlimited
life."1 Following the merger, Hilton can either put the costs of the
appraisal proceeding as an addition to good will or attempt to apply the
costs to adjust the basis of tangible assets it acquired from WaldorfAstoria. The Commissioner would be certain to insist that these capital
expenditures be accorded the former treatment, arguing that the acquiring
Hilton corporation increased the intangible benefits flowing to it from
the Waldorf corporation by increasing its own percentage of stock holdings as a consequence of the appraisal proceeding. Even if the taxpayer
were able to argue successfully for the application of appraisal costs to
an adjustment of the basis of tangible assets it acquired from the Waldorf
entity, a highly complicated allocation problem would remain. With either
treatment, the taxpayer is unlikely to realize any tax benefit from the
capital expenditures. The Hilton corporation will be able to recover the
costs of the appraisal proceeding only upon liquidation, making it probable that any tax advantage of an adjusted basis will never be realized.
Another problem concerns the Court's rejection of Hilton's -argument
that the appraisal costs should be regarded as obligations of the acquired
Waldorf corporation which the acquiring Hilton corporation assumed
and satisfied as ordinary and necessary expenses. The Court briefly noted
that since Hilton had conceded that the purchase price of the dissenters'
shares was a capital outlay, it could not successfully argue that the appraisal costs belonged to the Waldorf corporation.52 The Court's arbitrary dismissal of taxpayer's argument is clearly unsatisfactory. If the
"origin and character" test is applied to Hilton, the appraisal costs may
be seen to have originated as a consequence of Waldorf's statutory obligation to pay the dissenting shareholders the fair value of their shares,
i.e., the appraisal expenses arose in connection with an obligation of the
" 397 U.S. at 574-75; see also TREAS. REG. § 1.1001-1 (a) (1957).
" TREAS. REG. § 1.16 7 (a)-3 (1956).
11

397 U.S. at 584-85.
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disappearing corporation. Hilton, as the acquiring corporation, assumed
the obligations of paying the purchase price of the dissenters' shares and
paying the accompanying costs of the appraisal proceeding. The latter
expenses may be regarded as closely analogous to clearly deductible liquidation expenses."m As is the case with a liquidating corporation, Waldorf
will cease to exist as a corporate entity following the merger. What the
acquiring Hilton corporation is doing in paying the costs of the appraisal
proceeding (which initially arose as a part of Waldorf's statutory obligation to pay the dissenters for their shares) 4 is essentially the same process
involved when a liquidating corporation pays or satisfies its debts and
obligations. Here the obligation has merely been transferred to the Hilton
corporation in the course of the merger. There would appear to be little
reason for according transactions having essentially the same juridical
effect differing tax treatment.
In Woodward it is uncertain whether the capital asset with respect
to which the expenditures in question were incurred is only the stock
acquired from the dissenters or is all of the taxpayers' stock in the corporation. The issue then is which stock will receive an adjustment in basis.
The Court reasoned that the appraisal expenses arose as part of the
process of acquisition and had to be capitalized. Since majority stockholders in Woodward incurred the expenses of the appraisal proceeding
in the course of a transaction which undoubtedly affected the "character"
of their pre-extension stock interests, could not such expenses be regarded
as incurred with respect to all of the stock in the corporation and not just
that acquired from the dissenters? In this event, the taxpayers in Woodward would be entitled to a basis boost on all their stock in the corporation.
The decision in Woodward affords little guidance to this problem of basis
adjustment. The only tax consequence that is clear is that whatever stock
is benefited by the increase in adjusted basis, the benefit will be realizable
only upon an inter vivos disposition of the shares. As an intangible asset
with an unlimited life, the stock is nondepreciable, and there is no other
asset to which a basis boost can be applied.
Woodward and Hilton could well result in a change in the availability
of the appraisal remedy itself as a protective device for the interest of the
" See note 45 spra.
" The Court itself noted that establishment of the purchase price of a capital
asset was part of the process of acquisition. See text preceding note 32 supra.
It would follow from this that the appraisal expenses were part of Waldorf's obligation to pay to the dissenters the fair value of their shares.
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dissenting minority shareholder upon future corporate alterations. The
appraisal remedy may be regarded as the "quid pro quo for statutes giving
the majority [stockholders] the right to override the veto which previously
the holder of even one share could exercise against mergers, sales of all
assets, and other basic corporate changes."" The appraisal proceeding is
designed to protect the investment of the minority shareholder by assuring
6
that he receives a "fair value" for his interest in the corporation."
In order to determine such "fair value," parties are usually required
to make considerable expenditures in paying for legal, accounting, and
consulting services. Since legislatures and courts generally have failed
57
to provide for an apportionment of appraisal costs, the average investor,

'
"faced with outlays disproportionate to the value of his holdings," is
often handicapped in asserting his appraisal rights. Woodward and Hilton
would appear to impose an additional burden on the dissenting seller by
requiring his share of the appraisal costs, like those of the purchasing
majority, to be capitalized and not deducted. Although neither opinion so
9
states explicitly, the early Tax Court decision of Heller v. Commissioner,
allowing the seller to deduct his appraisal costs, is overruled by implication. Such a tax consequence could well revert the dissenter to his unfortunate position before the enactment of appraisal statutes when "the
minority was pretty well stuck with the new investment if the required
statutory majority approved the deal."6
Following Woodward and Hilton, a significant possibility exists that
corporations contemplating merger may opt to forego such a reorganization
when faced with the nondeductibility of appraisal costs and the likelihood
of appraisal proceedings being instituted by a minority of its own shareholders or by a minority of the newly-acquired corporation. Instead,
corporations faced with such a prospect may elect to effect a tax-free
acquisition of assets, in which the acquiring corporation exchanges its own

" Vorenburg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Right,
77

HARV.

L. REv. 1189, 1194 (1964).

"'Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HAv. L.
REv. 1453, 1456 (1966).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(e) (1965), provides: "The court shall assess the
cost of said proceedings as it shall deem equitable."
"Note, Appraisal of Corporate Dissenters' Shares: Apportioning the Proceeding's FinancialBurdens, 60 YALE L.J. 337, 341 (1951).

Joseph Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943), aft'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945).
'0 Doar, Protection of Minority Shareholders' Rights: Consolidation, Merger,
and Sale of Assets, 33 Wis. BAR BULL. 29, 34 (Aug., 1960).
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assets.0 1

stock or securities for all or part of another corporation's
With
the latter type of reorganization, the shareholders of the acquiring corporation have no recourse to the appraisal remedy under the law of most
jurisdictions; and, in one-quarter of the states, even the shareholders of the
acquired corporation cannot invoke the appraisal remedy.0 2 Thus it appears
that Woodward and Hilton could seriously impair the effectiveness of
statutory appraisal remedies as protective devices for the interests of the
minority shareholder.
E. CADER HOWARD

Labor Law-Issuance of Injunction to End Strike in Breach of
Arbitration Agreement
Since the turn of this century, Congress and the United States Supreme Court have endeavored to balance the respective powers of labor
and management. Whenever the scales tipped more favorably towards one
group than the other, the reaction has been to establish equilibrium either
legislatively or judicially. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
7701 is a striking example of this balancing process. The Supreme Court
held that a federal district court could enjoin a strike in breach of a collective bargaining agreement despite section four of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, which prohibits the granting of federal injunctions in labor-management disputes. Significantly, the Court reversed Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson,2 in which it had held to the contrary. Boys Markets points up

the unfortunate situation produced by the interaction of the NorrisLaGuardia 8 and Taft-Hartley Acts.'
Norris-LaGuardia was occasioned by the massive intervention of the
judiciary into labor-management relations.' Prior to its enactment, a
strike seemingly was labor's most potent weapon; however, management
a"INT. PV. CODE, of 1954, § 354(a) (1) provides: "No gain or loss shall be
recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are,
in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities
in such
corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization."
2
13A B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CORPORATE AcgnsiroNs

AND MERGERS

§ 2501[2] (1970).

U.S. 235 (1970).
2370 U.S. 195 (1962).
*29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
'29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1964).
1398

'See

(1932).

generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTiON
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easily countered any strike with an injunction, usually granted with little
reluctance by federal courts not particularly disposed to labor's cause. 6
Section four of the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act 7 prohibited federal courts
from enjoining strikes growing out of labor disputes. 8 The 1935 Wagner
Act9 also aided labor by including a federal guarantee of the right to selforganization and to engage in collective action-including the strike. In
order to restore the balance lost and to place labor and management on a
more equal footing, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.' 0 Section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Amendments opened "the federal courts to suits for
violations of collective bargaining agreements and, thereby, facilitated
enforcement of such contracts by removing some of the procedural disabilities blocking suits against unions in state courts."" Taft-Hartley
reflected congressional desire to promote industrial peace and harmony
through increased enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.'2 AcI
cordingly, in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills
' the Supreme Court

' State courts generally would not issue injunctions against peaceful picketing
for economic gains. See, e.g., Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900) ;
Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). However, since the
employer was usually a Delaware corporation, the federal courts would issue injunctions exercising their jurisdiction by diversity of citizenship. See generally
F.

FRANKFURTER

& N.

GREENE,

THE

LABOR INJUNCTION

(1932).

U.S.C. § 104 (1964), provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
729

interested in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in concert,

any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment ....
8
Although Norris-LaGuardia reflected a laissez-faire policy on the part of
government with regards to labor relations, it clearly served to give labor a larger
arsenal in its struggle against management. Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the PoliticalProcess: A Conent on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE
L.J. 1547, 1555 (1963).

029 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).

10 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1964). Indeed, Taft-Hartley could be classified as promanagement in a number of ways: It guaranteed the right to the employee to
refrain from union activity; it made it unlawful for a union to restrain or coerce
employees who did not want to strike; it outlawed the closed-shop agreement; and
it prohibited the secondary boycott.
" Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln
Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. Rxv. 32, 34 (1969). For example, the
common law rules of many states frustrated any and all attempts to serve process
and 1 execute judgment against unions, whereas employers were easily sued. Id.
2 Id.
1 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
The Court ruled that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not

deprive a federal court of jurisdiction to compel an employer to arbitrate grievances
in accordance with the arbitration clause of the agreement in question. Speaking
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gave added significance to section 301 by directing the federal courts to
14
fashion a body of federal common law to deal with subsequent suits.

The Court was not only desirous of achieving effective enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements, but also encouraged the development
of a uniform system of labor law. 5
Inevitably, the development of federal law under section 301 and the
anti-injunction provisions of section four of Norris-LaGuardia were
destined to clash. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson

provided an appro-

priate field for the ensuing struggle. Section four emerged victorious;
the Court held that federal courts were prohibited from enjoining labor
strikes even though a collective bargaining agreement enforceable under
section 301 had been violated. This decision seemed to fly in the face of
the Court's pronouncement in Lincoln Mills; a remedy available in most
state courts 7 was denied a party in federal court.
The majority in Sinclair relied heavily on the legislative history of
section 301 to demonstrate that the anti-injunction provision of NorrisLaGuardia was still viable and therefore controlled the disposition of the
case. This legislative analysis, when combined with a literal reading of secfor the majority, Justice Douglas explained that "the kinds of acts which had given

rise to abuse of the power to enjoin are listed in . 4 of [Norris-LaGuardia]. The
failure to arbitrate was not a part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act
was aimed." Id. at 458. Many commentators suggest that Taft-Hartley impliedly
repealed Norris-LaGuardia. Thus began what many regard as the encroachment of
section 301 on the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301:
The Patchwork of Avco and PhiladelphiaMarine on the Fabric of National Labor
Policy, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 980, 984-85 (1969).
" The Court stated:

Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for
an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does more
than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It
expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace
can be best obtained in that way ....

We would undercut the Act and

defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly as only conferring jurisdiction
over labor organizations.
353 U.S. at 455-56.
11 The development of federal susbtantive law under this mandate has been
arduous for three reasons: (1) the power of the court to enjoin certain acts conflicted with the federal anti-injunction laws; (2) the scope of federal jurisdiction
under section 301 was unclear; and (3) the courts were given insufficient procedural
guidelines to develop effectively the federal law of labor arbitration. Note, Federal
Enforcement of Grievance ArbitrationProvisions Under the Doctrine of Lincoln
Mills, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1139, 1145 (1958).
18370 U.S. 195 (1962).
'T Although twenty-four states do have "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts" on their
books, ten do not apply their acts to strikes in breach of collective bargaining contracts. Keene, supra note 11, at 49.
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tion four,"" enabled the Court to conclude that Congress did not want federal courts to intefere in labor disputes involving strikes that were in breach
of collective bargaining agreements. However, Justice Brennan, dissenting,
articulated the theory of judicial accommodation, which later proved more
formidable than the majority's logic. While conceding that "[S]ection
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act did not, for purposes of actions brought under
it, 'repeal' section four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," Brennan recognized
that "the two provisions do co-exist and that they apply ...in apparently
conflicting senses."'" He visualized the Court's duty as seeking out "that
accommodation of the two which will give the fullest effect to the central
purposes of both." 20 The result would be to place section 301 actions
21
beyond the ambit of the anti-injunction provision of Norris-LaGuardia.
Brennan's dissent in Sinclair ultimately became the ratio decidendi in
Boys Markets, in which the employer and the union were parties to a
collective bargaining agreement that provided that all disputes should be
resolved by arbitration and that during the life of the agreement, there
should be "no cessation or stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing or boycotts."122 A controversy arose when one of the employer's supervisors

and several non-union employees began to rearrange products in the
frozen food counter in one of the employer's supermarkets.2" A union
representative insisted that the counter be emptied and restocked by union
personnel. When the employer did not yield to the union's demand, a
strike was called and the union began picketing the employer's establishment. The employer immediately requested that the union terminate the
picketing and resort to the arbitration procedures set forth in the agree"'See note 7 supra.
19 370 U.S. at 215-16.

20 Id. at 216.
" Brennan apparently thought that reading the two acts together would do little
damage to section four, whereas section 301 would be significantly harmed if
accommodation was not allowed. Representative of the accommodation theory is
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40
(1957), in which the Court concluded that there "must be an accommodation of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purposes
in the enactment of each is preserved." A theory similar to accommodation is that
even if Congress rejected express repeal of Norris-LaGuardia by Taft-Hartley,
it did not mean that Congress intended to apply Norris-LaGuardia literally in
derogation of the articulated policies of Taft-Hartley. Congress may have intended
to leave to judicial interpretation the extent to which equitable remedies should be
available in section 301 suits. Note, Strikes and Boycotts: Section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardiaAct Held to ProhibitFederal Court Injunction of Strike Over an Arbitrable Grievance, 111 U. PA. L. Rnv. 247, 249-50 (1962).
22 398 U.S. at 239.
23Id.
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ment. Met with refusal, the employer obtained a temporary restraining
order in state court forbidding continuation of the strike. The union
removed the entire matter to a federal district court and requested that
the restraining order be dissolved. Concluding that the dispute was
subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement, the
district court denied the union's request, held that the strike was in violalion' of the agreement, and ordered the parties to arbitrate.2 4 The Supreme
Court, reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, affirmed the
district court order and overruled Sinclair.
Boys Markets will no doubt be applauded as one of the most beneficent labor decisions bestowed upon management in recent years. For
one thing, the questionable result yielded by the interaction of Sinclairwith
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, I.A.M. & A.W.25 will no longer
plague management. In Avco the Court allowed a union to remove to
federal courte8 a state court action brought by the employer to enjoin the
union from striking. Upon removal, the federal court typically denied
the injunction in keeping with section four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
even though the state court, from which the action was removed, could
have issued the injunction.27 Thus, state court jurisdiction was effectively
eliminated where management sought an injunction to end a strike in
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. After Boys Markets if the
union removes to federal court, management will be able to obtain an injunction in a federal court. Moreover, the negative effect that Sinclair
had upon arbitration will no longer be present. 28 The employer was with"Id. at 240.

25390 U.S. 557 (1968).
2628 U.S.C. § 1441(c)

(1964), provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would
be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise nonremovable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may
remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
*"There is a split of authority in this area. Some courts have said the language
of section four means there is no jurisdiction in the federal courts if only an injunction was sought and therefore have remanded the case to the state court.
Others have held to the contrary. Compare In re New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc. v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 276 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) with Sealtest
Foods-Branch 443 v. Conrad, 262 F. Supp. 623 (N.D.N.Y. 1966). See also General
Elec. Co. v. Local 191, 413 F.2d 964 (1969); Day-Brite Lighting Div. v. I.B.E.W.,
303 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
1 Sinclair's negative effect upon arbitration defeated the policy underlying the
Court's opinions in the Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
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out remedy in federal court when the union refused to comply with their
contractual agreements, thereby generating little incentive for the employer
to agree to arbitrate.
The Court in Boys Markets could have chosen to extend Sinclair
to the states29 consistent with the establishment of a national system
of labor law. 30 By precluding federal courts from issuing injunctions for
breach of contracts not to strike, the Court in Sinclair made state courts
the preferred forum by employers, and thus seriously impaired the volume
of federal court suits and the opportunity for federal development of a
uniform interpretation of labor-management contracts. However, the
Court realized that extending Sinclair to the states would hamper the
effectiveness of section 301 in promoting the speedy enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, such an extension, while establishing uniformity, would unnecessarily give labor the upper hand over
management. Stressing the importance of arbitration s ' as the overriding
consideration in labor-management disputes, the Court chose another, less
absolute method of achieving uniformity-federal courts should be able
to issue injunctions as well as state courts. Logically, the decision is
appealing; concurrent jurisdiction in the area of labor law* is preserved,
and the necessity for forum shopping is obviated."2 Furthermore, a certain
symmetry in the law is maintained, which serves to foster federal-state
relations in an area of national concern.
Although Boys Markets may herald a new era in labor-management
relations, a caveat is appropriate for those who would'read the decision
broadly. The case does not stand for the proposition that access to the
federal courts will now be allowed to any employer seeking to enjoin a
union from striking in breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The
Court made explicit the limited nature of its holding:
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In these cases, the Court held that where the issue
constitutes an arbitrable grievance, federal court authority did not extend beyond
determining the existence of a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration
clause and determining whether there was an allegation that a provision of that
agreement had been violated. The courts may not replace the judgment of the
arbitrator with their own, nor may they refuse to act, because, in their opinion, a
claim is frivolous or unwarranted. Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10
U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 292, 337 (1963).
"' The Court raised this possibility: "ilt is undoubtedly true that each of the
foregoing objections to Sinclair-Avco could, be remedied either by overruling,
Sinclair
or by extending that decision to the States." 398 U.S. at 247.
'0 See note 37 infra.
3 398 U.S. at 243, 252.
82
The result would also have been obtained if Sinclair had been extended to the
states.
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Our holding in the present case is a narrow one. We do not undermine
the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We deal only with the situation in which a collective-bargaining contract contains a mandatory
grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. Nor does it follow from
what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of
course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance....sa
Several principles were adopted to determine the appropriateness of
relief: the injunction must be appropriate in spite of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act; both parties must be contractually bound to arbitrate the grievance
and the contract must so state ;34 the employer should be ordered to arbitrate as a condition precedent to his obtaining injunctive relief against the
strike-" the injunction must be warranted under ordinary principles of
equity, i.e., whether the employer has been or will be caused irreparable
injury by the breaches.3 0

Although Boys Markets may have favorably restored the balance of
power between labor and management, one issue remains unresolved:
whether state courts must now apply the same principles as federal courts
in granting equitable relief? This issue will arise when management
obtains an injunction in a state court that would not have been issued in
federal court under the standards set down in Boys Markets. The union
will contend that the requirements for an injunction established by Boys
Markets should be made applicable to the states. The Supreme Court will
ultimately be called upon to resolve the issue. If the Court decides that
Boys Markets is inapplicable, uniformity in labor law will suffer due to
the different standards that state courts will inevitably establish.3 7 How33 398 U.S. at 253-54.
",That this principle must be met before injunctive relief will be granted in a
federal court is evidenced by the recent decision of Stroehmann Bros. Co. v. Local
427, Confectionary Workers, 74 LAB. REL. REP. 2957, 2960 (M.D. Pa. July 25,
1970), in which injunctive relief was denied to an employer because he and the
union were not contractually bound to arbitrate grievances.
" In Holland Constr. Co. v. Operating Eng'rs, 74 LAB. REL. REP. 3087, 3088
(D. Kan. July 27, 1970), the court referred to the requirements of Boys Markets,
and stated that "the employer should be ordered to arbitrate as a condition of obtaining an injunction assuming the other criteria favoring an injunction are also
present."
38370 U.S. at 228.
The doctrine of federal preemption does not necessarily arise in this context.
Although preemption usually applies when a state court attempts to resolve an
issue governed by a federal statute, the National Labor Relations Board, not a state
court, has authority to initially rule on a particular labor activity. Disputes over
labor agreements are usually left for judicial resolution, whereas, labor practices are
ruled upon by the Board. Breach of a labor contract is not considered an unfair
labor practice and is therefore left to the usual processes of the law. Stewart,
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ever, the Court, in the interest of uniformity, should hold that Boys Markets
is applicable to the states. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.38
emphasized that national labor policy could not tolerate inconsistent state
and federal court enforcement and interpretation of labor contracts:
Incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of
federal labor law . . . . The dimensions of § 301 require the con-

clusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the law is to be formulated under the
mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in suits of a kind
covered by § 301 to be decided according to the precepts of federal
labor policy .

. .

. [T]he subject matter of § 301 (a) "is peculiarly

one that calls for uniform law."3 9
The field of labor law stands on the threshold of a new era that promises
consistent development on both state and federal levels. Broad policies of
national interest will be the predominant concern in any labor-management
controversy. Past errors and incompatible doctrines should be cast aside
and resurrected only in historical comment. The judiciary should not take
umbrage at emerging concepts alien to past interpretations. As Justice
Stewart noted, concurring in Boys Markets, "[w] isdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late."' 40
ROBERT D. Rizzo

Restraints on Trade-Covenants in Employment Contracts not to
Compete within the Entire United States
The North Carolina Supreme Court has now put to rest the notion
that nationwide restraints on trade were per se illegal in North Carolina.
In Harwell Enterprises, Iw. v. Heim,- the supreme court upheld a re-

No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 673, 675-76 (1961);

H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONs AcT 546 (1948). The NLRB honors this
distinction. Repeatedly it has said it will not adjudicate contract violations. At
least one commentator disagrees. Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions AgainSt
Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor Contracts, 32 ALBANY L. Rlv. 303,

316 (1968).

"8369 U.S. 95 (1962).

'Id. at 102-03.

Justice Stewart borrowed this quote from Justice Frankfurter. 398 U.S. at

255.
'276 N.C. 475, 173 S.E.2d 316 (1970).
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strictive covenant in an employment contract in which the employee
covenanted that he would not compete with the corporation anywhere
within the United States for a period of two years. 2
The plaintiff-corporation was engaged in various business endeavors
including all phases of silk screen processing, plastics, importing and
various other ventures throughout the United States and brought this
action against its former employee for the violation of the restrictive
covenant.3 The case reached the North Carolina Supreme Court on a
demurrer which had been sustained by the court of appeals on the grounds
that the territory embraced in the restrictive covenant was too great. 4 In
ruling upon the demurrer the supreme court accepted, inter alia, the allegations that there was a valid written contract, that plaintiff-corporation
was engaged in this business throughout the United States, and that Heim
had acquired valuable trade secrets and technical processes, customer lists,
price information, and research and development data while employed by
plaintiff.5 The court said that "upon the allegations of the complaint,
which the proof may or may not sustain, the court should have overruled both demurrers and permitted the defendants to answer and proceed
to trial of the case on its merits."6 The supreme court, therefore, held
Id.at 476, 173 S.E.2d at 317.
3

Id. The action was commenced against Heim, individually, for violating his
restrictive covenant in the employee contract; and against Heim and Ballard, a
codefendant, trading as Metro Screen Engraving Co. of Gastonia, for conspiracy
to violate the covenant
'6 N.C. App. 548, 170 S.E.2d 540 (1969). The court of appeals determined
that the mere allegation of business throughout the United States which needed
to be protected was not sufficient, and stated that it was incumbent upon plaintiff to
show that such a business exists and that the contract was necessary to protect
such legitimate interest.
276 N.C. at 478, 173 S.E.2d at 318.
0
Id. at 480, 173 S.E.2d at 320-21. The supreme court in Harwelt apparently
felt that the burden rested upon the plaintiff to plead such facts in his complaint
that would show the covenant to be reasonable on its face. The issue before the
court on this demurrer was whether the complaint contained a plain and concise
statement of facts constituting a cause of action. What should the plaintiff be
required to plead to show that he has a cause of action? Under the pleading rules
applicable when this case was tried, the plaintiff needed not plead any more than
facts constituting a cause of action and a demand for relief to which the plaintiff is
entitled. He did not have to allege evidentiary facts, nor was he required to plead
the law. Furthermore, he was not required to anticipate and negate in advance the
defenses that the defendant may interpose. In Harwell the supreme court seemed
to vary these rules and require the plaintiff to plead more than would normally be
required. If the plaintiff in a Harwell situation is required to plead certain additional facts to indicate reasonableness, what of the many factors affecting reasonableness should he be required to plead? Why should not the burden fall on the
defendant, who arguably is in a better position to know if the covenant is un-
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that these allegations of the complaint constituted a valid cause of action.
This decision indicated that the covenant restricting employment throughout the United States was not void on its face.'
The earlier North Carolina precedent concerning nationwide restraints
on trade in employment contracts has been unclear although it seems to
have limited the area of noncompetition more severely than the court
has done in Harwell.
The leading case prior to Harwell was Comfort Spring Corp. v.
Burroughs' in which the defendant-employee covenanted that for a period
of five years after termination of the contract by either party, he would
not directly or indirectly enter into the employ of or represent a certain
named competitor within the entire United States.' The court sustained
the defendant's demurrer and held that the restriction covering the entire
United States was void arid unreasonable as to territory, and was unnecessary for the protection of the plaintiff.1"
The employee-defendant in Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris,:" cov-

enanted not to engage directly or indirectly in the same kind or similar
busirges$ as that of the plaintiff-corporation in Gastonia or in any other
town or city in the United States in which the plaintiff did or had sigreasonable as to him, to come forward with facts showing the covenant to be

unreasonable? A possible justification for the court's approach in Harwell is that
historically restraints of trade have been disfavored. Therefore, with no summary
judgment provision, the court, for the purpose of intercepting more quickly these
possibly unreasonable restraints has decided to require the plaintiff to plead the
scope of his business and facts showing that he was a legitimate interest to be
protected. The problem is that the supreme court has never articulated the reasons
for requiring the plaintiff to plead these things. Where does the plaintiff in a
Harwell situation look for guidance when he prepares his complaint? Under the
new North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff apparently will not be
required to plead the additional facts as he had to do in Harwell. The emphasis
in the new rules is on notice pleading-giving the defendant notice of the nature
and basis of plaintiff's claim to enable him to answer and prepare for trial-with
the use of other pretrial procedures to disclose more precisely the basis of the claim
and define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues. Fact interception is now
handled via the summary judgment procedure. See Sutton Y. Duke, 277 N.C. 94,
176 S.E.2d 161 (1970), for a decision interpreting N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1).
276 N.C. at 480, 173 S.E.2d at 320-21.
- 217 N.C. 658, 9 S.E.2d 473 (1940).
Id. at 659, 9 S.E.2d at 474.
10
Id. at 661-62, 9 S.E.2d at 475-76. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 276 (1955),
in which the Comfort Spring decision is cited in the list of cases that have held

nationwide restrictive covenants unreasonable. See also 2 J. STROlNG,

NORTH CARo-

INDEX 2d Contracts § 7 (1967), which cites Comfort Spring as authority for
the proposition that nationwide restraints are per se unreasonable and void in North
Carolina.
" 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955) (applying North Carolina Law).
LINA
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Judge Dobie, speaking for the court,

In Comfort Spring Corp. v. Burroughs, . . . defendant employee,

apparently a salesman, covenanted, inter alia, not to work for a certain
competitor anywhere in the United States for a five year period after
the termination of his employment with plaintiff-employer. The covenant was -breached, but the court held that the covenant was void
because it was unreasonable in territorial extent .... 18
Arguably Judge Dobie interpreted Comfort Spring as requiring that the
restrictive covenant in Morris be declared void and unreasonable since
the period was unreasonably long and the territory covered was too vast."
In Welcome Wagon International,Inc. v. Pender" there was a covenant by the employee-defendant which prohibited the employee from
engaging in business competitively with the employer in
(1) Fayetteville, North Carolina, (2) in any other city,

.

.. or other

place in North Carolina, in which the Company is then engaged in
rendering its said service, (3) in any city, . . . or village in the

United States in which the Company is then engaged in rendering its
said service, or (4) in any city ... or village in the United States in
which the Company has signified its intention to be engaged in rendering its said service.1 6
The covenant was declared void to the extent that it related to any place
in the United States where plaintiff was engaged or intended to carry on
business, but it was reasonable as to Fayetteville.1 The court in Pender
12 Id. at

696.

18 Id. at
14 Id. at

699.
694. Possibly Judge Dobie misconstrued the holding of the Comfort

Spring decision, as did the court of appeals and the defendant in Harwell. Comfort
Spring did not hold that nationwide restrictive covenants were ipso facto void

and unreasonable. However, Judge Dobie may still have reached the correct result.

The plaintiff in Morris alleged that he did business in many cities throughout the
United States, but there was no allegation or proof that the defendant-employee had
gained such trade secrets as would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the
employee was allowed to use them with another employer. Judge Dobie pointed
out in the opinion that no trade secrets passed from Welcome Wagon to Morris.
The procedural aspect of Morris-appeal from a denial of injunctive relief-was
different from that of Harwell--appeal from granting of a demurrer. It is interesting to note that the court in Morris made findings of fact even though it was
an appeal from denial of injunctive relief.
1255

N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).

"Id. at 246, 120 S.E.2d at 740.

17Id. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742. In considering the covenant the court said that
it was
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noted that "the court [in Comfort Spring] recognized, as valid, the rule
[reasonableness test] . . . but refused to restrain the defendant because
of plaintiff's failure to allege sufficient facts . . "1 The differences in
facts, allegations, and specific circumstances led to a result in Pender that
was different, though not conflicting, with that in Harwell. In Pender
the court certainly did not hold that nationwide restrictive covenants were
ipso facto void.
The defendants in Harwell had relied on Comfort Spring to support
their contention that the covenant in their contract was void because the
territory covered was unreasonable. However, the court in Comfort
Spring did not hold that nationwide restrictive covenants were ipso facto
unreasonable for the court there had expressly pointed out that "[t]here
is no allegation nor evidence as to the territory in which the defendant
is calling upon the plaintiff's customers .... In truth, there is no allegation
nor evidence as to over what territory the plaintiff's business extends." 9
Even though the defendant had acquired certain trade and confidential
information, the court indicated that the absence of the particular allegation that plaintiff does business throughout the United States left it
no choice but to declare the covenant unreasonable for purpose of the
demurrer. Apparently the court felt that the absence of this allegation
indicated on the face of the complaint that plaintiff had no legitimate interest that required protection throughout the entire United States.
Pender and Morris, likewise, would not support the plaintiff's contention that a nationwide restrictive covenant should be enforced. In both
Pender and Morris there were allegations that plaintiff did business
throughout the United States. However, in Pender there was no allegawithout power to vary or reform the contract by reducing either territory
or the time covered by the restrictions. However, where as here, the parties
have made divisions of the territory, a court of equity will take notice of

the divisions the parties themselves have made, and enforce the restrictions

in the territorial divisions deemed reasonable.... It is patent that division
(l)-Fayetteville--is not unreasonable. Likewise it appears that divisions
(3) and (4)-any city or town in the United States in which the plaintiff
is doing, or intends to do business-are unreasonable-and will not be enforced. Whether (2) is reasonable is for the chancellor.
Id. The court in Pender applied the "blue pencil test"--since the parties had made
divisions in the territory themselves, the court could "pencil out" the unreasonable
areas and permit the reasonable areas to stand. The Pender case was up on a
demurrer, and, therefore, only the allegations of the complaint were before the
court. There was no allegation that valuable trade secrets and confidential information 8was acquired by the defendant during the course of her employ.
' Id. at 249, 120 S.E.2d at 743. See note 6 supra.
10 217 N.C. at 661, 9 S.E.2d at 475.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

tion that the employee had acquired valuable trade secrets and confidential
information during the course of her employment.2 0 In Morris, there was
allegation that the employee had become acquainted with certain "methods,
systems, and trade usages" 2' during the course of her employment, but
the court stated that "there were no deep trade secrets, and no highly
22
confidential information was given by Welcome Wagon to Morris."
The court in both cases apparently felt that the plaintiff did not have
legitimate interests that required protection throughout the United States.
In Harwell the plaintiff alleged that he did business throughout the United
States. This allegation coupled with the allegation that defendant Heim
had acquired valuable trade secrets that could irreparably damage the
plaintiff competitively, allowed the court to overrule the demurrer and
uphold the nationwide restrictive covenant. The combination of these
two allegations was absent in Comfort Spring, Pender, and Morris.
Various states have approached the problem of nationwide territorial
restraints on trade in several ways. A few states have antitrust statutes
specifically limiting the enforceability of contracts restraining anyone from
exercising a lawful trade, profession, or business. Included in this category are Montana," North Dakota, 4 and Oklahoma,25 which prohibit any
such restrictive covenant, except where the covenantor is the seller of a
business who agrees not to compete within a specified county, city or part
thereof, so long as the vendee or his assignee conducts the business therein, or the seller is a partner who agrees not to compete in order to facilitate
dissolution of a partnership.26 California apparently prohibits postemployment restrictions although it does permit the enforcement of agreements that are ancillary to the sale of a business and its good will or incidental to a partnership dissolution.2 7
"0The court apparently felt that without this allegation the covenant would not
be reasonable. Thus, in effect, there would be no cause of action. See 255 N.C. at
249, 120 S.E.2d at 743.
21224 F.2d at 696.
" Id. at 701. This language indicates that "trade secrets" in and of themselves
are not sufficient. There must be "trade secrets" of the sort found in Harwell in
order that nationwide protection will be granted.
" MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 13-807 to -809 (1967).
' N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1959).
" OXLA. STAT. tit 15, §§217-19 (1961).
20 Note, Employment Contracts and Non Competition Agreements, 1969 U. ILL.
L.F. 61, 63.
" CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600-02 (West 1964). But see Ingrassia v. Bailey,
172 Cal. App. 2d 370, 341 P.2d 370 (1959). (Enforcing employee's agreement not to
solicit former employer's customers whose identities were confidential.)
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There are some states which by judicial decision hold void a contract
restricting the employee beyond the scope of his original employment,
even though the employer's business extends further ;28 while a few states
apparently hold, without regard to particular facts, that any restraint that
covers at least an entire state is invalid.29 Several states support the rule
that a restrictive covenant not to compete is ipso facto void if unlimited
as to territory 0 Even where there is no limitation as to territory, or
territory is expressly made unlimited, however, the majority of jurisdictions hold that the covenant is not ipso facto invalid 1 and apply the
test of reasonableness to the specific circumstances and facts of each case.32
Generally the nationwide restrictive covenant has been upheld where the
employer's business actually covered the United States and the breaching
employee had possession of "valuable trade secrets '' of the employer.3
However, where it does not appear that the employer conducted a nationwide business or that the employee had garnered such secret or confidential
. See Comment, Contracts in Restraint of Trade: Employee Covenants Not to

Compete, 21 Anx. L. REv. 214, 219 (1967).
" Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Dewberry, 204 Ga. 794, 51 S.E.2d 669 (1949);
Hubman Supply Co. v. Irvin, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 119, 119 N.E.2d 152 (C.P. 1953).
"' Vendo Co. v. Long, 213 Ga. 774, 102 S.E.2d 173 (1958) ; Magic Fingers, Inc.
v. Robins, 86 NJ. Super. 236, 206 A.2d 601 (Super. Ct. 1965) ; Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d

94, 125 (1955).
"Award Incentives, Inc. v. Van Rooyen, 263 F.2d 173' (3d Cir. 1959); Tuscaloosa Ice Mfg. Co. v. Williarms, 127 Ala. 110, 28"So. 669 (1899) ; Annot., 43
A.L.R.2d 94, 130 (1955).
"- See, e.g., Afinot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 116-21, 141-236 (1955). See generally these
North Carolina cases: Jewel Box Stores Corp. v. Morrow, 272 N.C. 659, 158
S.E.2d 840 (1968) ; Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Griffin, 258 N.C. 179, 128 S.E.2d
139 (1962) ; Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 9 S.E.2d 476 (1940) ; Scott v. Gillis,
197 N.C. 223, 148 S.E. 315 (1929).
" The use of the term "trade secrets" covers a broad area. General "trade
secrets" may or may- not b6 protected depending on' the circumstances. Ustially
secrets are protected when they are of'a spe6al 'type-secret t6dhnical processes
developed at gfeat expense. See generally Anrnot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 275 (1955) for
the'types of'trade secrets that are protected.
" See, e4, Irvington 'Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99,
46 A.2d 201 (1946); Eastman Kodak Co. v. 'Powers Film Prod., 189 App. Div.
556, 179 N.Y.S. 325, appeal denied, 190 App. Div. 970, 179 N.Y.S. 919 (1919);
Eagle ?Peritil ' Co. v. Jainseri, 135 Misc. 534, 238 N.Y.S: 49 (Sup. Ct. 1929). See
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 275 (1955); 36 Am. Jk Monopolies § 79 (1941).
'The fact that the employment is of such a charact~riis to inform the
employee of business methods and trade secrets, which if brought to the
'kn6wl~dge of "a competitor, would prejudice the interests of the employer,
tends to give an element of reasonableness to'a contract that the employee.
.will not engage ii a'similar business for a limited time after the termination
of his employment, and is always regarded as a strong reason for upholding.'
the contract.
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trade information that could cause irreparable harm to the employer,
nationwide covenants are declared unreasonable.3 The individual factual
situation and the specific circumstances of each case generally seem to
determine whether or not the covenant will meet the required test of
reasonableness."8
This test of reasonableness is comprised of three elements-reasonableness as to the employer, as to the employee, and as to the public interest. The reasonableness of each element is contingent upon the absence
or presence of a number of factors.8 7 As to the protection desired by the
employer, consideration must be given to the nature of the trade or business
involved, the nature of the employee's occupation, the nature of the skill
acquired by the employee during employment, the employee's contact with
customers, the employee's contact with and acquisition of trade secrets
and confidential information, and generally whether or not the employer
has a legitimate interest that requires protection. As to the reasonableness
of the covenant with respect to the employee, consideration must be given
to possible economic hardship to the employee and his family, the inconvenience to the employee resulting from the necessity of changing occupation or residence, and the nature of the skill acquired by the employee
during employment."8 As to the public interest, consideration must be given
to the interference with the utilization of the employee's skill and productivity, the possibility of a consequent shift of competition or creation
of a monopoly,3 9 the possibility of the employee becoming a public charge,
and the creation of opportunity of employment. Each of the elements must,
also, be considered in relation to the duration of the covenant and the
territory restricted by the covenant. 0 In order for the restrictive covenant
"'See, e.g., Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co. v. Lake Erie Eng'r Corp., 132 F.2d 403

(2d Cir. 1942); McCluer v. Super Maid Cook-Ware Corp., 62 F.2d 426 (10th Cir.
1932) ; Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Nenmich, 169 Mo. 388, 69 S.W. 355 (1902).
" In Jewel Box Stores Corp. v. Morrow, 272 N.C. 659, 158 S.E.2d 840 (1968),
the North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that time and area must be con-

sidered in determining reasonableness but neither is conclusive of the validity of the
covenant.
" See Comment, note 28 supra at 215-17; Blake, Employee Agreements Not to
Compete, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 625, 647 (1960); Note, Validity and Enforceability of
Restrictive Covenants Not to Compete, 16 WEs. Rzs. L. REv. 161 (1964). For
excellent discussions of these three elements of reasonableness and factors that
influence them, see 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 247 (1963) ; Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 141236, 275-77 (1955) ; Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 46-154 (1955).
"'For an example of this resulting situation see Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 141-236
(1955).
291d.
, See generally authorities cited note 37 supra.
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to be reasonable under a certain factual situation, there must be some
combination of the above factors to make each element reasonable in
respect to the duration of the covenant and the territory restricted by the
covenant.4" In balancing these elements, courts have found that the
covenant will be enforceable if it is ancillary to the employment contract;
if it is no greater than is required for the protection of the personemployer-for whose benefit the restraint is imposed; if it does not impose
undue and unreasonable hardship on the person restricted-employee; and
if it is not injurious to the public interest.42
When analyzing the reasonableness test, it does not seem impossible,
illogical, or unlikely that courts in North Carolina, under the appropriate
factual situations, could find a nationwide restrictive covenant reasonable
and enforceable. However, the Harwell decision is the first in North
Carolina to uphold such a covenant.
With the growth of nationwide business, increased use of nationwide
restrictive covenants will follow.
Because of the increased technical and scientific knowledge used in
business today, the emphasis placed upon research and development,
the new products and techniques constantly being developed, the
nation-wide activities (even world-wide in some instances) of many
business enterprises, and the resulting competition on a very broad
front, the need for such restrictive covenants to protect the interests
of the employer becomes increasingly important. If during the time
of employment new products are developed and new activities are
undertaken, reason would require their protection as well as those in
existence at the date of the contract, and to a company actually engaged in nationwide activities, nationwide protection would appear to
be reasonable and proper.4
But what of the employee bound by this restrictive covenant? Either he
must change occupations or leave the country; certainly neither alternative
is desirable. There must of necessity, be a balancing process between the
interests of the employer and employee. In traveling this path of bal• These factors are easy to list. The difficulty arises when one tries to apply
these factors to specific circumstances. See generally authorities cited in note 37
supra. The cases cited in those discussions will be an aid in determining what
factors are relevant in a particular situation and covenant.
"'See generally authorities cited in note 37 supra; Sineath v. Ratzis, 218 N.C.
740, 12 S.E.2d 671 (1940). Note, Employment Contracts and Non Competition
Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 61. See also 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 247 (1963);

Annot., 9 A.L.R. 1456, 1468 (1920).
"276 N.C. at 480-81, 173 S.E.2d at 320.
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ancing, the courts have adopted rules which reflect the whole evolution
of industrial technological advances, business methods, social values, and
popluation. In Harwell, North Carolina took the path of least net injustice.
MICHAEL GUNTER

Torts-Comparative Injury Doctrine of Nuisance
Should a court of equity close a forty-five million dollar cement plant,
thereby destroying the jobs of over three hundred workers and depriving
the county of important tax revenue, in order to prevent comparatively
minor damages1 to nearby property? This was the question that confronted the New York Court of Appeals recently in Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co.2 The cement plant emitted dirt, smoke, and vibrations which
neighboring property owners claimed injured their lands. The owners
filed -several suits asking the court to restrain the operation of the plant
as a nuisance and to award money damages for past injury. The trial
court found' that the operation of the plant did indeed constitute a
nuisance, even though the plant was equipped with the most effective
pollution control devices available, and that plaintiffs had been substantially
injtired. Damages for past injuries were awarded, but the court refused
to issue an injunction because of the great hardship it would bring upon
defendant and the comnunityY The appellate division affirmed.4
The court of appeals agreed with the lower courts that closing the plant
was too drastic a remedy but disagreed with the manner in which'the
lower courts had avoided such remedy. With one judge dissenting, the
court reversed the order of the trial court and instructed that an injunction*be issued unless defendant paid plaintiffs' permanent damages.
S-fch relief, "said-.the court, would do justice between the parties as it
would fully redress the economic loss to plaintiffs' properites without being
overly- oppressive to defendant. Citing United States v. Causby,5 the
' , Approximately 535 dollars per month.
"2- 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). This decision consolidated appeals handled separately by the appellate division.
' Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup, Ct.
f967).
o "-Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 30 App. Div. 2d' 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452
(1968); Meliak v. -Atlantic Cement Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 578, 295 N.Y:S.2d 622
(1968) (mem.).
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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court said "[t] he theory of damage is the 'servitude on land' of plaintiffs
imposed by defendant's nuisance." 6 And, said the court, since plaintiffs'
acceptance of the permanent damages would be in compensation for a
servitude on the lands, plaintiffs would be barred from future recovery.'
Apparently the court's decision overrules previous New York cases6
and aligns the state with those jurisdictions which adhere to the comparative injury doctrine.9 That doctrine, stated simply, says that a court of
equity should deny injunctive relief, notwithstanding the fact that the
existence of a nuisance and substantial injury to plaintiff have been established, when issuance of the injunction would cause defendant much
greater hardship than continuance of the nuisance would cause plaintiff.Y
Such balancing of equities has been justified by courts which accept
the doctrine as a natural consequence of several fundamental principles of
equity. These courts insist that the granting or withholding of relief by
a court of equity always rests in the discretion of the chancellor. As one
court has put it, "To an injunction ... no one has an absolute and unqualified right. Such an application appeals to the conscience of the
chancellor, to the exercise of a wise and sound discretion .... 11
The extraordinary nature of injunctive relief is also stressed as supporting the comparative injury doctrine. Most likely a court about to
compare the hardships will make some comment reminiscent of Mr. Justice
Baldwin's statement that "[t]here is no power the exercise of which is
-26 N.Y.2d at -, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319.

judge Jasen in his dissent attacked the majority's apparent overthrow, of the
long-standing New York rule that a nuisance which results in substantial continuing damage to neighboring property should be enjoined. The judge also
referred to the grave dangers to health cause by particulate pollution and to the
unconstitutionality of allowing defendant to impose a servitude on plaintiffs' lands
by the payment of money damages. As an alternative to the majority's conditional
injunction, Judge Jasen proposed issuance of an absolute injunction to take effect
in eighteen months if the nuisance was not abated by then. 26 N.Y.2d at -, 257
N.E.2d at 875-77, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319-22.
8
E.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913);
McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907) ; Strobel v.
Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900).
'For a thorough discussion of this doctrine see McClintock, Discretionto Deny
Injunwtion Against Trespass and Nuisance, 12 MINN. L. REv. 565 (1928);
Mechem, The Peasant in His Cottage: Sonze Comments on the Relative Hardship Doctrine in Equity, 28 S. CAL. L. REv. 139 (1955); Annot., 61 A.L.R. 924
(1929); Annot., 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 881 (1911).
" E.g., Pritchett v. Wade, 261 Ala. 156, 73 So. 2d 533 (1954) ; Storey v. Centtal
Hide & Rendering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 226 S.W.2d 615 (1950) ; Beard v. Coal River

Collieries, 103 W. Va. 240, 137 S.E. 7 (1927).
" McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 F. 927,
940 (9th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 583 (1909).
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more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound
discretion, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuing of an
injunction... ."" Likewise the comparative injury jurisdictions point out
that a court of equity should never grant relief which would be inequitable
or "operate contrary to the real justice of the case."'1 3 From such principles of equity these courts conclude that an injunction is not the proper
remedy when it would cause defendant disproportionately greater hardship than continuance of the nuisance would cause plaintiff.
Not all courts agree, however. Previous New York cases 1 4 and a substantial number of other jurisdictions 5 reject the notion of balancing the
equities. These courts argue that whenever a clear case of nuisance is
established and the wrong causes plaintiff substantial injury which cannot be adequately remedied at law, plaintiff has an absolute right to injunctive relief even though there is a large disparity in the economic consequences of the nuisance and of the injunction.1"
Courts which refuse to balance the equities generally disagree with
12 Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R.R., 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (No. 1617) (C.C.D.N.J.
1830). For an example of a nuisance case employing such a statement see Bartman
v. Shobe, 353 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1962).
" McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 F. 927,
940 (9th Cir. 1908).
" See cases cited note 8 supra.
SE.g., Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 181 Ark. 216, 26 S.W.2d 57
(1930); Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928
(1911); Wente v. Commonwealth Fuel Co., 232 Ill. 526, 83 N.E. 1049 (1908);
Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn. 374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919);
Hennessey v. Carmony, 50 N.J. Eq. 616, 25 A. 374 (1892).
North Carolina apparently rejects the comparative injury doctrine also.
"[W]here a nuisance is established.., no private enterprise for the mere purpose
of bringing gain to its owner can be allowed to destroy one's home or to impair
his health. Both are irreparable injuries, and no damage can compensate a man
for destruction of his home or for the undermining of his health." Redd v. Edna
Cotton Mills, 136 N.C. 342, 344, 48 S.E. 761, 762 (1904). However, the state's
courts will balance the equities when an injunction would cause "public inconvenience" and that term is given a very broad meaning. See Attorney General ex
rel. Bradsher v. Lea, 38 N.C. 301 (1844); Barnes v. Calhoun, 37 N.C. 199 (1842).
" Phrased more eloquently:
The law, in cases of this kind, will not undertake to balance the conveniences,
or estimate the difference between the injury sustained by the plaintiff and
the loss that may result to the defendant from having its trade and business,
as now carried on, found to be a nuisance. No one has a right to erect
works which are a nuisance to a neighboring owner, and then say he has
expended large sums of money in the erection of his works, while the
neighboring property is comparatively of little value. The neighboring owner
is entitled to the reasonable and comfortable enjoyment of his property,
and, if his rights in this respect are invaded, he is entitled to the protection
of the law, let the consequences be what they may.
Susquehana Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 282-83, 20 A. 900, 902 (1890).
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the comparative injury jurisdictions as to the nature of equitable relief,
contending that such relief is not "of grace" but is a matter of right
whenever plaintiff is able to make out his case.
The phrase "of grace" predicated of a decree in equity . ..has no

rightful place in the jurisprudence of a free commonwealth, and ought
to be relegated to the age in which it was appropriate. It has been
somewhere said that equity has its laws as law has its equity. This
is but another form of saying that equitable remedies are administered
in accordance with rules as certain as human wisdom can devise,
leaving their application only in doubtful cases to the discretion,
not the unmerited favor or grace of the chancellor. Certainly no chancellor ...will at this day admit that he dispenses favors or refuses

rightful demands, or deny that, when a suitor has brought his cause
clearly within the rules of equity jurisprudence, the relief he asks is
demandable ex debito justitiae, and needs not be implored ex gratia.17
Courts which hold this view of the nature of equitable relief argue that
the comparative injury doctrine takes the property of the poor and gives
it to the rich,18 and "puts the hardship on the party in whose favor the
legal right exists instead of on the wrong-doer." 9 Furthermore, these
courts contend that the injunction cannot result in injury to defendant
because defendant is not injured by being restrained from doing that
which he had no right to do.2"
The dichotomy between those courts which reject the comparative
injury doctrine and those which accept it, however, is not as distinct
as the foregoing discussion might suggest. The dividing line is blurred,
sometimes beyond recognition, by the exceptions that many of the courts
which purport to reject the doctrine make to their no-balancing rule.
For example, most jurisdictions balance the equities on applications for
injunctions pendente lite and refuse such applications where the injunction
would injure defendant much more than continuance of the nuisance
would damage plaintiff.2 Likewise, the equities may be balanced whenever: (1) plaintiff's injury is trivial per se even though occasioned by an
Pa. 549,
25 A. 1,125,
127N.E.
(1892).
McElroy,
" Walters
Whalen v.v. Union
Bag 151
& Paper
Co., 557,
208 N.Y.
5, 101
805, 806 (1913).
1 3. PomERoy, EQUITABLE REmEDIES § 530 (1905).
" Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 558, 25 A. 125, 127 (1892).

'

1

" E.g., United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385 (C.C.D. Del. 1905) ; Sexton v. Public

Serv. Co-Ordinated Transp., 5 N.J. Super. 555, 68 A.2d 648 (1949); Huskin v.
Yancey Hosp., Inc., 238 N.C. 357, 78 S.E.2d 116 (1953).
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admitted nuisance ;22 (2) plaintiff is guilty of laches or there is an element
of estoppel present ;2 (3) plaintiff comes to the court in bad faith, as
when he seeks the court's aid only to force defendant to pay an exorbitant
price for his property;24 or (4) the public has an interest in the continuation of the nuisance.25 These exceptions, combined with the agility with
which some jurisdictions are able to alter their viewpoints,2 0 make simple
categorizations of a court's position extremely perilous and render predictions of whether a given court will or will not balance the equities in
a particular case most unreliable.
But if a court does balance the equities and the balancing results in
the denial of the injunction, one question is invariably raised: Does the
denial of the injunction amount to an improper taking of plaintiff's
property? Boomer vividly demonstrates the problem. Defendant's activities invaded plaintiffs' property rights. The court, however, instead of
ordering the cessation of the wrongful acts, allowed defendant to purchase
those rights which were being invaded and placed plaintiffs in such a
position that they had no choice but to sell the rights.27 Such action would
appear to amount to a kind of private, and therefore unconstitutional, inverse condemnation. s
Most courts which deny injunctive relief after balancing the conveniences, however, are not impressed by the private condemnation argu22 E.g., MacDonald v. Perry, 32 Ariz. 39, 255 P. 494 (1927); Gray v. Man499, 28 N.E. 498 (1891).
hattan Ry., 128 N.Y.
'8See Grey ex rel. Simmons v. Mayor of City of Patterson, 60 N.J. Eq. 385,
45 A. 995 (1900); Knoth v. Manhattan Ry., 187 N.Y. 243, 79 N.E. 1015 (1907);
Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 10, 177 P. 418 (1918).
' See Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46 (1878).
"E.g., Daughtry v. Warren, 85 N.C. 136 (1881); Booth-Kelly Lumber Co.
v. City of Eugene, 67 Ore. 381, 136 P. 29 (1913).
" Compare Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065
(1904), with Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345
(1924).
2 Of course plaintiffs could have refused to accept the permanent damages and
maintained successive actions at law for damages as further injury was incurred.
Such a course, however, is so onerous as to eliminate it as a realistic alternative.
"Boomer is strikingly similar to inverse condemnation cases such as Ferguson
v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 NE.2d 801 (1936), and Papphenheim v.
Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 128 N.Y. 436, 28 N.E. 518 (1891). In cases of this
type, defendant's activities substantially impair some property right of plaintiff and
suit is brought to enjoin the acts causing the injury. Since the defendant possesses
the power to condemn the invaded property the court usually grants an injunction
conditioned on defendant's payment of plaintiff's permanent damages and thereby
avoids forcing defendant to institute a separate condemnation proceeding. The
critical difference between these cases and the principal case is that the Atlantic
Cement Co. had no power to condemn the property rights which the operations of
its plant invaded.
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ment. Many, 9 including the United States Supreme Court,"° follow the
practice of the court of appeals in Boomer and make little or no reply to the
contention. Others hint that the emphasis on the constitutional impropriety of the court's action is misplaced and that the only question
involved concerns the abiltiy of a court of equity to mold its judgment
to fit the circumstances of the case. And this ability, it is said, is not
affected by defendant's lack of the power of condemnation.3 1 One court,
replying directly to the condemnation contention, noted that similar arguments could be advanced in cases in which injunctions are denied because
of the adequacy of the remedy at law.3 2 "The answer to the 'condemnation'
argument," said the same court, "is that one who comes to equity does so
by choice. Equity forces nothing from him, and he may stand on his legal
remedies if he wishes. But if he wants equity he must do equity."3
Neither the courts' silence, nor their emphasis on the powers of equity
courts, nor their instructions on what one must do to merit equitable relief,
however, resolves the issue. The fact remains that defendant has, in
effect, been allowed to condemn plaintiff's property rights for private purposes by creating a nuisance which invades those rights. If such action
is not unconstitutional, it would seem that the courts should be able to
state why it is not.
Another problem raised by Boomer and neglected by the opinion
concerns the terms of the conditional injunction. Should provision be made
to allow defendant to recover part of the damages paid if the nuisance
is abated in the future? Or, conversely, should the decree allow plaintiffs
to return to the court if the nuisance becomes more intense in the future?
Probably the court need concern itself with neither of these contingencies when drafting the decree. As for the possiblity of future
abatement, it is generally said that where a nuisance is not legally abatable
the defendant cannot object to the assessment of permanent damages
because the court will presume that the nuisance will continue to operate
" See cases cited note 10 supra.
01 See Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); New
York City v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93 (1902).
" Knoth v. Manhattan Ry., 109 App. Div. 802, 96 N.Y.S. 844 (1905), aff'd,
187 N.Y. 243, 79 N.E..1015 (1907).
"Bartman v. Shobe, 353 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1962).
Id. at 555. Interestingly enough one court has suggested that the issuance of
an injunction that would cause defendant comparatively greater hardship than continuance of the nuisance would cause plaintiff would constitute an improper appropriation of defendant's property. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron
Co., 113 Tenn. 331,83 S.W. 658 (1904).
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under the same conditions for an indefiinte period.34 Since defendant's
ability to in fact abate the nuisance will not prevent the recovery of
permanent damages, it may be assumed that he should not be allowed to
recover any money paid to plaintiffs if the nuisance is actually abated.
On plaintiffs' side, so long as the nature and extent of the servitude conveyed to defendant by acceptance of the permanent damages is clearly
defined, plaintiffs should have no trouble obtaining relief from increased
injury by an action to enjoin the overburdening of the servient estate.
Defining the nature and extent of the servitude conveyed, however, may
itself present serious difficulties since it is an open question how an easement to pollute is to be measured.
Notwithstanding the questions left unanswered by the decision in
Boomer, it is difficult to quarrel with the majority's resolution of the
conflict between the parties. The facts of the case placed the court in the
unenviable position of being forced to choose between following its former
decisions and closing the cement plant or overruling itself and awarding
plaintiffs what seems less than adequate remedy. No other alternative presented itself. The cement company could not be forced to experiment with
pollution control devices because its plant already had the best available.
Retention of the case to allow the court to keep the situation under its
supervision would have been possible but would not have satisfied the needs
of plaintiffs. And a delayed injunction, such as that proposed by the
dissent,3 5 would have amounted to nothing more, under the circumstances,
than a delayed closing of defendant's plant. Thus it appears that the
course followed by the majority was the only practical solution to the
problem.
This is not to say that the decision is to be applauded. On the contrary, it is most unsatisfactory. Pollution continues to emanate from
defendant's plant-pollution which not only injures plaintiffs' properties
but also damages the health of the general public. And the fact remains
that plaintiffs have been afforded inadequate relief. All that can be said
about the decision is that it is an example of a case which, because of the
limited powers and resources of the courts, is incapable of satisfactory
judicial resolution.
It must be remembered, however, that all pollution cases are not as
extreme as Boomer. Seldom do the facts of a case force a court to elect
"Northern Ind. Pub. Ser. Co. v. W.J. & M.S. Vesey, 210 Ind. 338, 351, 200
N.E. 620, 626 (1936).
526 N.Y.2d at -, 257 N.E.2d at 877, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
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between closing a multi-million dollar operation, thereby devastating a
large business and destroying the economy of an entire community, and
awarding the plaintiff inadequate relief. In the majority of pollution
cases other alternatives are present. For example, it may be possible to
reduce or eliminate the injurious pollution by obligating the defendant
to install effective pollution control devices. Or, where the defendant
is an extremely wealthy concern, it may be possible to stimulate the
development of new and more efficient pollution control devices by forcing
investment in research. At the very least, a court should explore all
plausible courses of action before resorting to the comparative injury
doctrine as a means of resolving the dispute. Such resolution is so unsatisfactory, especially in the pollution area where the public interest is
great, that it should be limited to cases in which the facts allow no other
solution. Above all the courts must not evade the problems raised by the
pollution crisis by indiscriminately employing the doctrine of comparative
injury.
FRED H. MooDY, JR.

